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The development of an efficient processing infrastructure is critical for the budding 
cellulosic ethanol industry. Developing a diverse feedstock portfolio is one crucial part of this 
process which can lead towards economically feasible cellulosic ethanol production. Cellulosic 
ethanol production requires the production and transportation of large quantities of biomass. 
Sugarcane and other dense grasses offer a compelling path towards a successful biomass supply 
chain. This is particularly applicable for Louisiana, which produces more than a third of the 
sugarcane in the US. The Louisiana sugar belt already has an infrastructure adapted to this task, 
and taking advantage of this is one key way that a cellulosic ethanol plant can benefit from the 
region‟s endowment. Additionally, the area has very large and sophisticated biomass processing 
facilities in the form of sugar mills. Finally, production of renewable energy from biomass is an 
area that is filled with economic uncertainty, both from the market and from economic policy. 
Dealing with this uncertainty will be crucial to any firm that attempts to operate in the cellulosic 
ethanol industry in the foreseeable future. 
This study focuses on several possibilities for aiding the development of the cellulosic 
ethanol industry, including feedstock development and building upon and within existing 
agricultural infrastructure. The Louisiana sugarcane belt is the target area of the study, which 
concentrates on sugarcane bagasse, energy cane, and sweet sorghum as cellulosic feedstocks. 
This study examines several possible scenarios and feedstock combinations, finding that 
a combination of sugarcane bagasse, energy cane, and sweet sorghum could supply a profitable 
cellulosic ethanol plant situated in the Louisiana sugar belt. By collocating with a sugar mill, a 
cellulosic ethanol plant can gain further advantage in the form of reusing capital and other fixed 
costs. This collocation is found to offer substantial benefits to both the cellulosic ethanol 
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processor and the sugar mill, offering a diversified revenue stream, which enhances both 
operations. 
Finally, by employing real options analysis to the question of uncertainty in the market, it 
is found that a cellulosic ethanol plant can separate feedstock decisions from production and 
capacity decisions in a manner that mitigates downside potential from at least some types of 
market and policy shocks. This is found to greatly enhance the value of the firm in cases where 





CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The global demand for energy is massive and growing. Liquid fuels in particular are a major 
component of the energy market in every economy in the world. In the US energy market, these 
liquid fuels primarily consist of fossil fuels from sources outside our own country. On average, 
19,480,000 barrels of petroleum were consumed each day in the United States in 2008, and 
11,114,000 barrels of that (or 57%) was imported (EIA, 2008). Any viable energy strategy must 
then recognize the inherent limitations in relying primarily on foreign, non-renewable fossil 
sources for our liquid fuel needs. Aside from the need to manage the supply of these depleting 
fossil energy sources, the need for energy security is a large motivator for displacing some 
traditional fuels with renewable, sustainable alternatives. A crucial part of our energy policy 
going forward will be to find, develop, and maintain renewable domestic sources to satisfy some 
of our growing energy demands while reducing our dependence on foreign fuels. Domestically-
obtainable types of renewable liquid fuels include corn ethanol, non-corn ethanol, and biodiesel.   
Ethanol 
Traditionally obtained via the fermentation of sugar-containing starch crops, ethanol has been 
periodically examined for fuel use in the United States for over a century. Throughout most of 
this period, the largest barrier to ethanol adoption has been economic feasibility. Compared to 
petroleum, ethanol was simply cost-prohibitive, at least until 1973. Since the Oil Embargo in 
1973, US energy policy has moved steadily towards a petroleum shortage-management regime, 
which has naturally led to an increased interest in “alternative fuels.” Given the easily-
manageable nature of the fermentation of agricultural goods into alcohols, agriculturally-derived 
ethanol was a natural choice for a home-grown alternative fuel (Meekhof et al., 1980).    
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 After the price of oil came back down, the emergency drive towards alternative fuels was 
significantly reduced, but research continued in both the private and public sectors. Evidence 
started to mount quickly that suggested that bio-ethanol, though still economically infeasible, had 
significant potential as an alternative fuel. Oil price drops and governmental controls helped 
ensure that ethanol researchers had the time and funding to examine critically traditional ethanol 
production from the fermentation of starchy crops like corn (Lee et al., 1991).   
 While the vast majority of this country‟s ethanol is produced from corn, this is by no 
means the only option. In Brazil for instance, 80% of the vehicles in the country run on ethanol 
produced from sugarcane. The ethanol yield from an acre of sugarcane is almost twice that of 
corn, and some other crops are even more efficient on a per-acre basis.  
Historical Ethanol Policies 
Though the history of ethanol‟s use as a combustible fuel goes back to at least the early 
nineteenth century, the U.S. government did not start addressing ethanol until the American Civil 
War. Early in the conflict, the federal government established a heavy excise tax of $2.08 per 
gallon on liquor to help pay for the war effort. The demand for ethanol, commonly used at that 
time as a fuel for lamps, fell under this policy, and was effectively taxed out of the market. In 
keeping with political tradition, this tax was not repealed after the war, and was actually in effect 
until 1906 (EIA, 2005).   
After the ethanol tax was repealed, some demand returned for combustible ethanol. As 
electric lighting had begun spreading across the country in the 1880‟s, there was little demand 
for ethanol as a lamp fuel anymore, but Henry Ford‟s automobiles represented an entirely new 
market, and many of the early cars ran on some combination of ethanol and gasoline. Due to this 
early use as a motor fuel, the market for ethanol was soon affected by another war, as World War 
I saw the demand for ethanol fuel rise sharply (NESEA, 2008). 
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The next great impact that ethanol would see from the federal government was the 
enactment of Prohibition on January 29, 1920. As a fermented grain product, ethanol was banned 
along with all other liquors. However, since it could still be sold when blended with petroleum, 
ethanol began finding a market as a fuel additive, used to boost octane. After the end of 
Prohibition in 1933, this use expanded somewhat. When World War II came shortly afterward, 
ethanol experienced another wartime boost, but this time it was primarily for non-fuel purposes. 
Since the relatively cheap gasoline had gradually become the standard in motor fuels, ethanol 
fuel more or less disappeared after the war (EIA, 2005).   
The next big event in federal ethanol policies would not come until 1974. The Solar 
Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act contained within it some incentives for 
the research and development of fuels from organic materials, though it was primarily concerned 
with various forms of solar energy (PL. 93-473). 
Ethanol‟s use as an octane booster started in the early twentieth century, but it was far 
from the only such substance used in gasoline. The most common of these substances for 
decades was lead. When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began investigating, 
regulating, and eventually banning the use of lead in gasoline in the 1970s and 80s, ethanol was 
once again thought of as a possible octane booster (EPA, 1973).    
Ultimately though, the most common fuel additive became Methyl tert-butyl ether 
(MTBE) after lead‟s phase-out. MTBE offered the same anti-knocking and octane-boosting 
benefits as lead, and in the higher concentrations used starting in the early 1990s, offered 
significant air quality benefits as well. However, the natural-gas-derived MTBE showed a 
tendency to leak from storage tanks and runoff into waterways or seep into groundwater. Though 
it has yet to be officially addressed by the federal government, various state and local 
governments began restricting the use of MTBE in the late 1990s. In its place, both ethanol and 
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the ethanol-derived Ethyl tert-butyl ether (ETBE) have become the standard additives for 
reformulated gasoline (EPA, 2008).  
In 1978, the Energy Tax Act created a legal definition of “gasohol,” a gasoline and 
ethanol blend with at least ten percent ethanol content by volume. In addition, this law 
specifically exempted the fuel ethanol from the four-cent-per-gallon excise tax on gasoline, 
effectively creating the first federal subsidy for ethanol‟s use as a motor fuel. This amounted to a 
forty-cent-per-gallon ethanol subsidy, which was later raised to 50 cents with 1982‟s Highway 
Revenue Act and 60 cents with 1984‟s Deficit Reduction Act. This rising trend was first reversed 
in 1990‟s Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, and the subsidy has been gradually reduced to its 
current 51 cents per gallon (Solomon, 1980). 
In addition to direct payments in the form of subsidies, starting in 1980 the federal 
government began assisting the fuel ethanol industry via other protections and non-monetary 
incentives. The Energy Security Act and Gasohol Competition Act were both efforts to make the 
motor-fuel marketplace more competitive for the ethanol industry and especially the smaller 
producers. In addition, Congress established a new tariff on imported ethanol with the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980, protecting domestic ethanol producers from competition 
coming from Brazil and other ethanol-producing nations.   
Additionally, 1988‟s Alternative Motor Fuels Act (AMFA) essentially provided 
automobile manufacturers and fuel-distributors with a guaranteed market for alternative fuels 
and alternative fuel-powered vehicles by mandating the inclusion of alternative-fuel-powered 
vehicles into the federal government‟s transportation fleet, requiring the availability of alcohol 
fuels where federal vehicles are fueled, and making it easier for these vehicles to be fit into 
federal budgets. It also created new guidelines for fleet fuel-economy labeling for alternative-
fuel vehicles, which effectively allowed manufacturers of such vehicles to claim higher gas 
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mileage on their labels than the vehicles actually achieved by multiplying the actual mileage by 
an adjustment factor. When taken together, the impacts of AMFA were intended to help the still-
new industry by eliminating some of the risk involved in entering the market (EIA, 2003).  
Providing additional guaranteed market for ethanol, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990 mandated significantly expanded use of reformulated gas in many metropolitan areas. 
Since MTBE was beginning to fall out of favor, this eventually amounted to a boost in demand 
for ethanol and ethanol-derived ETBE. Additionally, the various tax benefits for ethanol blenders 
were extended to producers of ETBE in 1995, setting it up to become the fuel additive of choice 
(EPA, 1991).    
Current Ethanol Policy 
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 can be seen as starting the modern era of alternative fuel policy. 
Aside from expanding on earlier regulations concerning vehicle fleets, the law established new 
incentives for private citizens who wished to purchase alternatively-fueled vehicles or to convert 
their own vehicles to alternative fuel use. These tax deductions and low-interest loans were also 
extended to fuel-providers for the installation of equipment specific to the dispensing of 
alternative fuels.   
The 2004 Jobs Creation Act redefined some of the processes and specifics of the ethanol 
subsidy, and extended the policy into 2010, but there was no net change in the subsidy itself. The 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 also had no direct effect on ethanol, but in requiring all alternative-
fuel-capable federal fleet vehicles to actually use alternative fuels all the time, the law created a 
temporary shortage of fuel-ethanol. Additionally, the law greatly expanded the mandated 
quantity of ethanol that would be required in domestic fuels, incrementally increasing this 
amount over the next eight years (Tyner, 2007). 
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Up to 2007, this federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) called simply for the production 
of billions of gallons of ethanol. Without any further specification, the mandate was largely filled 
by conventional corn ethanol. The passage of the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act 
(EISA) changed that. Of the 36 billion gallons mandated for production in by 2022, 21 billion 
gallons are to come from non-cornstarch derived biofuels, and 16 billion gallons are to come 




In February of 2010, the EPA finally concluded its years-long review of the original RFS 
and released its new standard, the RFS2. The long-term goals did not change, and the short-term 
production targets were only modestly changed. However, there is one major change that is 
relevant to this study. Under the RFS, there is a category of biofuel called “advanced biofuel.” 
  In order for a fuel to qualify for this designation, it must be shown to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions by at least 50% over gasoline. Under the original RFS, there was no specific 
mention of ethanol derived directly from sugarcane, but under the RFS2, sugarcane ethanol is 






































































Figure 1 - Timeline of Ethanol Policies  
Source: Mark et al., 2010 
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produced via Brazilian-style methods achieve a 61% reduction on a lifecycle basis. Since the 
RFS standards call for 21 billion gallons of advanced biofuels by 2022, and 16 billion gallons of 
that from cellulosic ethanol, that leaves a 5 billion gallon mandate for other advanced biofuels 
that could be filled by ethanol from sugarcane juice (EPA, 2010). 
Sugarcane 
Louisiana‟s climate makes it a good location for the production of multiple biofuel crops. Of 
particular interest to Louisiana is the possibility of producing commercially viable quantities of 
ethanol from sugarcane. There are several possible mechanisms by which this might be 
accomplished, but the two that have been most frequently explored are “juice” ethanol, obtained 
by fermenting high-sugar cane juice, and cellulose or biomass ethanol, which is obtained via an 
enzymatic process performed on the entire biomass portion of the crop. Salassi (2006) found that 
juice-based sugarcane ethanol is not likely to be economically feasible, given currently projected 
gas and ethanol prices. However, the Brazilian method of taking the first two strikes of juice for 
sugar production and using the remaining juice for ethanol production has never been studied in 
Louisiana, and may show potential for profitable production. It is not yet clear how cost-effective 
a cellulosic ethanol process would be using the full sugarcane stalk, but the biomass content of 
traditionally harvested varieties is not likely to be high enough for the ethanol produced to be an 
economically feasible product on its own. There are other varieties that are currently being 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Renewable Biofuel 9.0 10.5 12.0 12.6 13.2 13.8 14.4 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
Advanced Biofuel 0.6 1.0 1.4 2.0 2.8 3.8 5.5 7.3 9.0 11.0 13.0 15.0 18.0 21.0
Cellulosic Biofuel 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.8 3.0 4.3 5.5 7.0 8.5 10.5 13.5 16.0
Biomass-based Diesel 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0
Undifferentiated Advanced Biofuel 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0
Total RFS 9.0 11.1 13.0 14.0 15.2 16.6 18.2 20.5 22.3 24.0 26.0 28.0 30.0 33.0 36.0
Figure 2 - Biofuel Mandate Schedule 
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developed that have much higher biomass yields however, and a full-plant cellulosic ethanol 
process may indeed end up being a viable option using some of these “energy cane” varieties.   
These energy cane varieties represent a large risk for the farmer though, since they 
contain very low levels of sugar and could not therefore be efficiently ground for sugar 
production. In order for the farmer to actually be able to switch to energy cane, he would have to 
be able to generate as much revenue from the ethanol produced as he gives up in lost sugar 
revenue, assuming identical costs. Whether or not this could happen is dependent upon market 
prices for sugar and ethanol, as well as pricing strategies employed by biofuels producers. The 
uncertainty in the market, however, makes it unlikely that any farmers will switch to energy cane 
in the short term. This presents a problem for a processor who is interested in building a 
cellulosic ethanol plant, as no viable feedstocks will be available for processing at least in the 
short term. The planting cycle for all cane varieties means that a processor would likely be 
limited to the current low-biomass varieties for at least one or two years, and possibly longer. 
However, there may be a third way. In a current sugarcane mill, the cane is ground and 
three products are produced:  raw sugar, molasses, and bagasse. The raw sugar is sent to a 
refinery where it is processed into refined white sugar. The molasses is sold and generally ends 
up being used as a livestock feed additive. Most of the bagasse is burned and used to provide 
electrical power for the mill, offsetting the need to buy natural-gas-generated electricity from the 
grid or other fuel for the boilers. However, most mills actually produce much more bagasse than 
would be needed to produce the power they need. Since local utilities rarely allow this power to 
be sold back to the grid, the boilers are instead run as inefficiently as possible so as to burn as 
much of the bagasse as they can. Even so, most mills still produce excess bagasse, which must 
then be trucked out and disposed of. 
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If a cellulosic ethanol plant were available at the sugar mill, ethanol could be produced 
from some or all of the on-site bagasse, which would not affect the raw sugar or molasses 
generated by the mill. Given a representative mill that grinds 12,000 tons of cane per day during 
the harvest season, about 15,000 gallons of ethanol could be produced per day from the mill‟s 
excess bagasse (Day, 2010). This would represent about a 6 million gallon annual capacity, if the 
bagasse were available year-round. If all of the onsite bagasse were used to make ethanol, this 
figure would be 85,000 gallons daily, or 30 million annually. In the latter scenario, power would 
have to be generated via some other boiler fuel, such as natural gas. If the ethanol generated from 
this process had a higher value than the deferred cost of boiler fuel that comes from burning the 
bagasse, then the ethanol plant would be able to generate added value from the same sugarcane 
harvest that it already sees. If only the excess were made into ethanol, the entire process would 
be a value-add, though external feedstocks might have to be acquired in order for the plant to 
reach commercial levels of production.    
Why Louisiana? 
One of the advantages of building an ethanol system around Louisiana sugarcane is that much of 
the infrastructure is already in place. The area has long had sugarcane fields and mills in 
desirable spatial relationships, as shown respectively by the shaded parishes and the ovals in 
Figure 3, and the transportation capacity is already very high. From a logistical standpoint, 
overlapping a sugarcane ethanol system on top of the existing sugar infrastructure makes sense. 
If existing sugar mills could also process cane fiber into ethanol and if sugarcane farmers grew 
some mix of both traditional sugarcane and the higher biomass-content energy cane, they would 
be able to send all of their harvest to the same place, and the output would be a mix of ethanol 




Figure 3 - Location of Louisiana Sugar Belt and Sugar  Mills 
Source: Mark et al., 2010 
 
In 2008, Louisiana produced 12 million tons of sugarcane, producing 1.2 million dry tons 
of bagasse, enough to make a theoretical 100 million gallons of cellulosic ethanol (USDA, 
2009). Furthermore, the Louisiana sugar belt presents several other opportunities for energy 
crops. Several high-fiber breeds of energy cane have been extensively studied and found to have 
high potential as a cellulosic ethanol feedstock (Alexander, 1985; Turhollow, 1994). However, 
energy cane does have some disadvantages. The primary source of difficulty is the lifecycle of 
11 
 
the crop. Due to the perennial nature of the crop and the fact that it does not produce harvestable 
yields until its second year, energy cane represents a large commitment of time and land for a 
producer, and is thus likely to meet with some initial resistance in the absence of long-term 
contracts. As the ethanol plant begins showing profits, contracting for energy cane should 
become less of a problem (ASCL, 2009). 
Until then, sweet sorghum offers an additional route of feedstock diversification. As an 
annual crop, it represents less of a commitment to the producer and is something that can be 
contracted for on a yearly basis. Further, sorghum stocks could potentially be added to the 
plant‟s input stream starting in the first year, given its short lifecycle. Sweet sorghum growth in 
south Louisiana has not been studied quite as much as energy cane has, but there is enough to 
suppose that it could be a reliable energy crop. (Viator et al., 2009). 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the feasibility of creating an advanced biofuel 
industry in Louisiana that could coexist with and derive synergistic benefits from existing 
agricultural activities. Specifically, this research examines the biofuel industry from the 
perspective of a potential producer of ethanol derived from sugarcane and/or cellulosic 
feedstocks. It approaches questions of feedstock strategy, collocation with existing processing 
facilities, and the management of risk and uncertainty. Results and conclusions derived from this 
research will provide processors and producers with strategic tools to analyze project feasibility. 
In addition, policy-makers and stakeholders can utilize the results for this research to understand 
the industry and the potential for its future in this region. 
Objectives 
The objectives of this research can be divided into three parts: 
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1) The first objective of this paper is to develop a simulation model of a cellulosic ethanol 
plant running on some combination of locally sourced bagasse, energy cane, and sweet 
sorghum and test the economics of various feedstock strategies. 
2) The second objective of this paper is to develop a simulation model of a sugar mill 
collocated with a cellulosic ethanol plant capable of running on bagasse, energy cane, 
sweet sorghum, and other cellulosic feedstocks. The collocated plant is examined for its 
potential to profitably produce ethanol either from sugar or from bagasse. 
3) An expansion to this mill is modeled, bringing the capacity up to commercial scale. The 
mill is then tested for its response to uncertainty in production parameters and market 
conditions. Using Real Options Analysis, the decisions faced by the operators are 
examined when negative market shocks are randomly incorporated.   
Objective 1 – Stand Alone Cellulosic Ethanol Plant 
In order to break into the ethanol market, a plant will have to make use of the feedstocks 
available. The inbuilt sugarcane infrastructure in south Louisiana makes for a tempting 
candidate, but sugar is generally too profitable for producers to be interested in diverting 
substantial quantities of sugarcane to produce conventional ethanol (Salassi, 2006). The large 
quantities of bagasse produced as a byproduct of the sugarcane milling process might present a 
different situation. The sugarcane industry is one that has large amounts of cellulosic material 
that is discarded as a by-product that could potentially be used for cellulosic ethanol. Further, 
using this by-product from this industry helps to solve the first mover problem of feedstock 
development versus capacity building. Locating a cellulosic ethanol facility next to one or more 
sugar mills allows the plant to be constructed and begin operation without first contracting with 
growers to produce another feedstock. The primary advantage of this is that it gives producers 
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confidence that if they do contract with the plant that a market exists for their energy crop, 
whereas, other strategies for the development of this industry do not offer this (Day, 2010).  
Of particular interest to Louisiana is the possibility of producing commercially-viable 
quantities of cellulosic ethanol from sugarcane, either via bagasse, which is the fibrous cellulose-
based byproduct of milling sugarcane, or high-fiber energy cane varieties. The processing flow 
of sugarcane can be seen in Figure 4, illustrating the source of bagasse. 
 
Figure 4 - Sugarcane Processing Flow 
 
For cellulosic ethanol to become a viable option, two profitability conditions must be 
met. First, the grower of the feedstock must be profitable, and secondly the biofuel producer 
must be profitable. The feedstock producer‟s profit has been examined in previous research, but 
production profitability has not been examined from the perspective of the biofuel processor. The 
first objective of this research is to explore the possibility of locating a cellulosic ethanol facility 
in the south Louisiana sugar belt. Three different feedstock scenarios are examined using Net 
Present Value (NPV) analysis to gauge their feasibility. Additionally, a sensitivity analysis is 




Objective 2 – Cellulosic Ethanol Plant Collocated With Sugar Mill 
Another key to the development of an advanced biofuel industry in south Louisiana is 
developing the capability to synergistically coexist with the existing agricultural infrastructure, 
including the ever-prevalent sugar mills. The second objective of this research is to develop an 
analytical framework that can be used to study the possibility of collocating ethanol processing 
capabilities within sugar mills as well as the resulting structural change of inputs.  
Sugar is the main source of profit for the mill, and as such, the bulk of the profitable sugar 
will not be sacrificed. The first two cycles of sugar production, called first strike and second 
strike, remove about 80-85% of the raw sugar from the cane juice. It might be possible to process 
the remaining juice into ethanol using conventional methods, following the Brazilian model. The 
first coproduct, molasses, could also potentially be processed into ethanol using conventional 
methods. For collocation to become a reality though, the structural changes that must take place 
at the mill need to be examined. 
The fibrous byproduct, bagasse, can be processed into ethanol using a cellulosic process, 
which could also be applied independently or jointly with other available or potential sources of 
biomass. It is this step in the processing cycle that this research is primarily concerned with. 
Specifically, this research examines the possibility of collocating a cellulosic ethanol processing 
plant at the same site as a sugar mill, to run initially on the excess bagasse from the sugar mill. 
The mill could also potentially run additional fibrous feedstocks through the grinders and make 
ethanol from the biomass, and even run sugar juice and/or molasses through the latter part of the 
ethanol facility to make conventional ethanol. Depending on the particular situation, this research 
might also be applicable to other regions that grow and process high-biomass crops, such as 
sweet or forage sorghum, miscanthus, switchgrass, and possibly fast-growing tree species. To 
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begin with though, no specially-harvested energy crops will be included in the model, only 
bagasse. 
The potential benefits of collocating a cellulosic ethanol plant include reduced transportation 
costs when using on-site bagasse, fully-established transportation and unloading systems, and the 
ability to reuse some capital like grinders and storage. The added flexibility to switch 
conventional feedstocks between ethanol and sugar/molasses production depending on the 
market prices for each also allows the facility to maximize profits whenever prices of the two 
commodities change. 
The potential to collocate an ethanol-processing plant alongside a sugar mill is an area of 
research that needs to be explored further. The second goal of this research is to model such a 
mill using simulation techniques, and then explore some questions about the input and output 
conditions created by the mill, given the addition of sugar ethanol and/or cellulosic ethanol 
processing capabilities.   
Objective 3 – Expanding The Collocated Plant Under Uncertainty 
The third objective of this research is to develop an analytical framework that can be used to 
study the potential to collocate large-scale cellulosic ethanol processing capabilities within a 
Louisiana sugar mill in an environment of both risk and uncertainty, and to present an alternative 
valuation method that may help decision makers understand the value and risks contained within 
different economic opportunities. 
 The framework should have general value for various types of production and processing 
facilities, but for this research the crops studied are sugarcane, energy cane, and sweet sorghum. 
Sugar is the most reliable source of profit for the sugar mill, and as such it will be examined as 
one potential source of uncertainty in market conditions, alongside oil prices and the continued 
existence of federal ethanol subsidies. The resulting framework will provide processors and 
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decision-makers with a set of tools with which they can take greatest advantage of any 
specialized knowledge they have about market conditions, production parameters, and policy 
developments. 
Why Real Options? 
 
Walters and Giles (2000) state that, while real options analysis (ROA) has some features 
in common with classical NPV analysis, ROA is valuable, “… when investment involves an 
irreversible cost in an uncertain environment. And the beneficial asymmetry between the right 
and the obligation to invest under these conditions is what generates the option's value.”  In the 
case of the collocated ethanol plant, there is a clear place where this decision point can be 
examined.  If a cellulosic ethanol plant is going to produce ethanol at a capacity that relies on 
energy cane, it must first contract for the crop and wait for a productive quantity to be available 
for harvest.  Given the long production cycle of sugarcane (and thus energy cane), which can be 
seen in Figure 5, this effectively translates to a four year lag between contracting with the 
growers and having enough cane for the intended plant to run in a cost-effective manner.  Given 
an assumed two year build time for the modeled ethanol plant, this gives the processor a two year 
window to observe the market and decide whether or not to build the plant.  
Translated into real options analysis terminology, this means there is a European Call 
option to build with an expiration date two years from contracting, a price equal to the amount 
needed to enter into the contract, and an exercise price equal to the cost of building the ethanol 
plant. For ease of demonstration, it is assumed that the small-scale (10 million gallon/year) 
collocated cellulosic ethanol plant already exists onsite which is capable of running strictly on 
available bagasse if necessary. The operational decision will be whether to expand this pilot 
plant to a full-scale cellulosic ethanol facility with an annual capacity of approximately 70 
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million gallons, which could only be sustained if there is significant local production of energy 
cane.   
 
Figure 5 - Energy Cane Planting Cycle – Expanding from 1 acre to 35 acres 
Source: Mark et al.,2010 
   
Initial Plant 
 
For this research, the initial plant is modeled as a 10 million gallon plant capable of 
running on 100% bagasse if necessary, but with a preference to run on a combination of bagasse 
and harvested feedstocks. Based on existing corn ethanol plants and on models from the National 
18 
 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) for cellulosic ethanol, a full-size plant producing 
commercial-scale quantities of ethanol is also designed, with an annual capacity of 70 million 
gallons. This is modeled separately, as an expansion to the smaller plant.  The risk portfolio for 
the mill changes significantly when switching between these two plants for two major reasons.  
Firstly, the smaller plant can run strictly on bagasse if necessary, while the larger plant must have 
a ready supply of energy crops or other non-bagasse feedstocks in order to run profitably. 
Secondly, the sugar mill with the smaller collocated plant still draws most of its revenue from 
sugar, limiting its exposure to the volatility of the ethanol market, while the larger capacity plant 
would mean that the facility‟s largest revenue stream will be from ethanol. 
After the first year, it is assumed that the plant will be able to attract a small number of 
producers, so some production of sweet sorghum and energy cane begins to take place.  To fill 
out the 10 million gallon capacity of the small initial plant, about 10,000 acres of energy crops 
are required, given average expected yields. 
The Expansion Decision 
 
In the rest of this study, it is shown that this 10 million gallon plant is, given expected 
output parameters, a project worth considering. The downside risks are relatively low, even 
given various shocks to the output parameters, and the existence of a backup feedstock like 
bagasse means that the plant is also fairly insulated from shocks to the input parameters.  
 However if the plant wished to expand to a more commercially-standard capacity like 70 
million gallons, some of the advantages disappear, and the plant becomes a more vulnerable 
venture. With ethanol revenue approaching or exceeding that from sugar, the entire mill is more 
exposed to the market and production conditions. The decision to expand carries with it unique 
risks and uncertainty, in addition to very large potential benefits. 
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 It is this decision that the current research is focused on. A commercial cellulosic ethanol 
plant is subject to significant levels of uncertainty from many different areas, and of many 
different types. This research cannot study all possible sources of uncertainty, but will instead 
cover a small number of the most significant sources. 
 Given this uncertainty, the firm has incentive to delay the final decision as long as 
possible. However, in order to ensure that the plant, after the two year construction time, has 
enough ready feedstock to be able to begin recouping its construction costs, the mill must make 
one other decision prior to the final decision to build the plant.  Specifically, the mill must decide 
to contract with energy cane producers to plant significantly larger amounts of energy cane two 
years prior to the beginning of construction, which results in planting beginning one year prior, 
and capacity being a roughly the break-even amount during the expansion‟s first year of 
operation.   
 In ROA terms, contracting with the growers for this new higher quantity is the equivalent 
of buying the option to expand capacity. If, during the intervening two years between writing the 
contract and needing to start construction, market conditions or production parameters change 
significantly enough that the expected value of the expansion project turns negative, the mill can 
“let the option expire” by simply not beginning construction. The mill‟s losses are equal to 
whatever it cost to contract with the growers for the expanded quantity. If the mill instead 
decides to exercise the option by building the plant, the potential losses could be much higher. 
The value of the option (to build or not build) is essentially represented by the value saved by 
letting the option expire in a down market instead of building and taking larger losses. If 
expected conditions are positive, then the mill will exercise the option, and the value of the 
project follows the same value path as traditional NPV analysis. For this reason, only negative 
shocks will be studied in this research. 
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 In order for the real option to have value, there must be a significant chance that 
unexpected negative market or production conditions could arise in the years between buying 
and exercising the option. Since uncertainty is, by its nature, unpredictable, a large range of 
potential negative shock chances will have to be considered. 
 The risks and uncertainty facing potential cellulosic ethanol producers are an area of 
research that needs to be explored further. The goal of this research is to model some of the 
uncertainty facing a collocated plant using simulation techniques, and then explore some sources 
of uncertainty to learn more about how they might affect the business decisions facing the plant.   
Interested Parties 
Louisiana sugar mills are one set of stakeholders that would be interested in this research, for 
several reasons. If building an add-on ethanol processing facility would be a profitable endeavor 
that would pay for itself and provide additional revenue streams, this would interest any mill 
owner or cooperative seeking to increase profits. Not only could revenues be increased during 
the traditional sugarcane harvest season, but if other feedstocks were brought in during different 
periods of the year, the mill would be able to increase the period over which it has cash inflows.  
Additionally, the added revenue stream could diversify risk across multiple commodities and 
spread fixed costs out.  
But the uncertainties inherent in the decision to expand to commercial capacity are daunting, 
especially to a sugar mill faced with the potential reality of having ethanol become its primary 
revenue source. Real options analysis can help make the strategic decision a simpler one to 
understand. 
Sugarcane farmers are another group likely to be interested in this line of research.  
Sugarcane acres in Louisiana peaked in 2000 at 465,000, but since then have been decreasing by 
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an average of two percent annually, with a minor uptick for 2009 and 2010, as shown in Figure 6 
(USDA, 2010).  
 
Figure 6 - Sugarcane acres in Louisiana 
Source: NASS 2011 
 
Additionally, revenues from sugar have been decreasing, as have earnings-per-acre (Salassi 
and Deliberto, 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009). The price of sugar did spike in 2009, but there is no 
guarantee that it will stay elevated for long. Expanding into the ethanol feedstock market would 
leave sugarcane farmers less exposed to changes in the market price of sugar.  
 
Study Area 
This research is focused on south Louisiana, where the production of sugarcane is concentrated. 
With rising input costs and uncertain sugar prices, producers are looking for new sources of 
revenue, and processors are looking for feedstock diversity and new revenue streams. Long-term 
contracts for cellulosic feedstocks would provide producers with greatly-desired certainty, and 












































































































































streams. The existing infrastructure is already highly developed and well-suited to the efficient 
harvest and transportation of large quantities of fibrous crops. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 As cellulosic ethanol is a relatively new area of research, the body of literature directly 
associated with it is somewhat limited. However, there have been some very good economic 
analyses performed in the area that bear discussion. 
Cellulosic Ethanol Production 
Wooley et al. (1999) produced an extremely thorough cost analysis framework for a cellulosic 
ethanol plant, which later formed the basis of many further studies on production economics in 
this area. The specific dollar figures used in the study are no longer strictly relevant, but the basic 
conclusion was that given some reasonable assumptions about technological development, the 
production process of lignocellulosic ethanol should scale up to a commercial-scale plant that 
would be economically profitable. 
 Aden et al. (2002) wrote an updated look at the production economics outlined in Wooley 
et al.,(1999), and revised cost and technological development assumptions based on research in 
the intervening years. They found that, in general, the situation had improved, and that the 
potential to profitably produce cellulosic ethanol at a commercial scale had increased. Again, the 
precise dollar figures are out-of-date, but the results essentially indicate that the expected break-
even ethanol price was about 30% lower than previously projected in the 1999 study. 
 In addition, Aden et al (2007) found that cellulosic ethanol from woody or non-specific 
biomass was likely to be cost-competitive with corn ethanol by 2012. The process on which that 
study was based included a thermochemical conversion process rather than the biochemical 
lignocellulosic pretreatment process used in this research, but the conclusions are applicable due 
to the similar nature of the respective cost breakdowns. The portion of production costs 
24 
 
determined by the pretreatment processes are similar for the two plant types that Aden studied in 
the two NREL publications produced by that team. Both of these also used discounted cash flow 
and net present value for their economic analyses.  
 Shapouri and Salassi (2006) found that the other advanced biofuel in this study, sugar 
ethanol, could not be profitably produced in the United States, given expected prices for sugar 
and for ethanol. The central insight for this research is that, while both can be produced from 
Louisiana sugarcane, cellulosic ethanol and sugar ethanol face very different economic realities 
and the domestic production of the two fuels is likely to face two very different futures in this 
country. 
Collocation of Ethanol Processing 
Economic theory would suggest that collocation of two related industrial processes can achieve 
cost savings from multiple areas. For cellulosic ethanol production from corn stover, research 
has been done on collocation of the cellulosic ethanol plant with a traditional ethanol plant 
running on a conventional corn-to-ethanol conversion process. This can lead to cost savings from 
five main areas: utilities costs, ethanol purification/distillation, primary and by-product 
processing, fermentation, and transportation costs (Wallace et al, 2005). With a cellulosic ethanol 
plant using sugarcane bagasse, energy cane, and sweet sorghum, some of the potential savings 
could come from similar areas, with the exception of the fermentation and purification steps, 
since no ethanol is produced at a sugar mill. In addition, savings could be realized from the 
preprocessing area, as the grinders used for sugarcane could also be used for energy cane and 
sweet sorghum. 
 A few studies have been done in the corn ethanol area that provide some idea of how the 
economics of processing collocation might actually turn out. McAloon et al (2000) examined 
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lignocellulosic ethanol from corn stover collocated with a corn ethanol plant and concluded that 
most corn ethanol plants would not have excess capacity in certain processing areas like 
fermentation and distillation, meaning no cost savings could come from those areas. They also 
concluded that, without a previously existing large-scale cellulosic ethanol plant, it is difficult to 
estimate the additional labor needed to handle a cellulosic feedstock like corn stover, which has 
very different characteristics from the primary feedstock for the plant, corn. These concerns do 
not really apply to the scenario studied in this research, as the two processes being combined do 
not have to share ethanol processing capacity, and the cellulosic feedstocks being handled are 
extremely similar in nature to the previously existing feedstock for the combined mill. 
Uncertainty 
According to Knight (1921) and Chavas (2004), uncertainty occurs when a priori information 
about a probability distribution is unknown. Sources of uncertainty in agribusiness can be 
categorized into: Business/Operational, Financial, Market Conditions, Technology, Business 
Relationships, and Policy & Regulation (Detre et al., 2006). 
The risk and uncertainty profile faced by a sugar mill is well understood, both by the 
literature and by the processors themselves. However, if a sugar mill were to add cellulosic 
ethanol processing capacity to its previously existing operations, it would be faced with sources 
of risk and uncertainty unlike anything the operation had previously dealt with. In particular, if 
the ethanol output accounted for a significant portion of the facility‟s expected revenue streams, 
the combined plant would essential transform from a traditional agricultural processing facility, 
complete with government price supports, to an energy company competing in the tempestuous 
world of liquid fuels. 
26 
 
 The uncertainty faced by a cellulosic ethanol plant collocating with another agricultural 
processing facility has not been studied directly, but similar strategic investment decisions have 
been examined in the literature, often using the same real options methodology employed in this 
research. In general, the literature has supported the two basic ideas present in this part of the 
current research: (1) irreversibility of investments and uncertainty in market or production 
parameters are very important factors in these kinds of strategic decisions, and (2) under these 
conditions, real options analysis can be a valuable tool to model optimal investment behavior.  
 For example, Purvis et al (1995) found that “uncertainty about costs […] is an important 
determinant of dairy producers‟ investment behavior,” and used real options to explain and study 
this behavior. Carey and Zilberman (2002) applied real options analysis to the issue of irrigation 
technology adoption. They found that “the uncertainty of future water supplies and prices and the 
quasi-irreversible nature of an investment in modern technology,” shaped the decision-making 
process and meant that analysis with real options was useful. They also found that there would 
be good reason to later extend their model to incorporate the ability to reduce or eliminate the 
technology investment after the initial adoption, but found that an assumption of total 
irreversibility simplified the model without significantly changing their results. Similarly, this 
research assumes near-total irreversibility of investment, with only a small salvage value 
attached to the capital involved in the cellulosic ethanol plant. A further extension might 
incorporate some form of investment reduction such as partial utilization or even capacity 
reduction via disinvestment. 
 Price and Wetzstein (1999), in examining commercial peach production in Georgia, 
found that uncertainty and irreversible investments can drastically impact production decisions, 
causing optimal strategies to differ significantly from those found with net present value 
analysis. Relatedly, Richards and Green (2003) found that uncertainty and irreversible 
27 
 
investments delay adoption of new wine grape varieties. Their application of real options 
analysis shows that growers are following a decision-making pattern consistent with option 
valuation when they delay investment in new varieties. 
 Engel and Hyde (2003) used real options to examine the decision to adopt new milking 
technology in dairy operations. Under the assumed conditions of uncertainty and irreversibility 
of investments, they found that the optimal decisions computed differed significantly from those 
found with traditional capital budgeting techniques such as net present value analysis. This 
finding was robust to changes in many parameters studied. Odening et al (2005) similarly found 
that, in an uncertain environment, an option value strategy would generate significantly different 
recommended choices than net present value analysis, and that hog producers in Germany 
seemed to be making investment decisions consistent with those suggested by options valuation. 
 Tzouramani and Mattas (2004) used real options analysis in a case study examining 
greenhouse construction. They found that, “the real options approach can be proved useful with 
assessing projects with uncertainty and irreversibility and it can provide a new way of examining 
agricultural investment decisions.” In a paper that was somewhat more related to the current 
research, Stokes et al (2008) also found that real options analysis could be applicable to the 
investment by dairy farmers into methane digesters for the purposes of on-site power generation. 
They found that producers in Pennsylvania were rational to resist investment in the absence of 
grant funding, despite what traditional net present value analysis might suggest. Such grant 
funding acted as financial compensation for the uncertainty inherent in the project. 
 Overall, there are many examples in the literature of other researchers examining ethanol 
production, collocation of various production facilities, and real options analysis under 
uncertainty. However, no study or body of research has yet combined these into a study of the 
specific economic conditions that would be faced by a cellulosic ethanol plant that collocated 
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with a traditional agricultural processing facility such as a sugar mill. This research is intended to 
contribution exactly that combination of factors, in an effort to advance the literature in this area. 
While the current research specifically examines Louisiana sugar mills as the agricultural 
processing facility in question, the findings could be applicable to many other such facilities in 
this and other countries. 
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
There are several basics of analysis that are important to understand in order to proceed with 
developing a methodology for this study. This chapter first examines some of the methodological 
techniques before delving deeper into the methodology used for each individual objective. 
Net Present Value 
One of the measures by which the tested scenarios were analyzed was their Net Present Value 
(NPV). NPV analysis is a technique that is used to determine the total value of a project in 
present cash value, which is calculated by subtracting initial cash outlays from a discounted set 
of cash flows from the project. The NPV model is specified as: 
     
  
      
 
   
     
  
      
  
  
      
     
  




 Fn is the net cash flows that can be realized in year n 
 Fo is the initial cash outlay 
 N is the planning time span 
 d is the discount rate 
The cash flow from each year is discounted to its present value, and all of these values are added, 
along with the negative cashflow from the initial setup costs. If this value is positive, the 
investment is acceptable. If negative, it is not acceptable, and if zero it is indifferent. The size of 
a project‟s NPV can also be used to ranking it against rival projects (Barry, et al, 2000). This tool 
can, for instance, be used to determine whether a collocated ethanol facility would be a better 
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investment than a similarly structured stand-alone facility. This will be used for several such 
comparisons throughout this study. 
 However, NPV and the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) methodology underlying it suffer 
from two basic problems that prevent them from being the primary method by which the facility 
is analyzed. Firstly, DCF is deterministic with respect to its input values. As such, NPV analysis 
alone cannot incorporate the risks inherent in the real-world probabilistic inputs. To address this, 
a researcher can vary some key inputs by fixed amounts, which amounts to a sensitivity analysis. 
Alternatively, taking this a step further, the input values can be allowed to vary randomly over 
some distribution and the problem can be analyzed over thousands of such random drawings. 
Monte Carlo simulation is an effective tool to accomplish this. 
 DCF and NPV analysis also assume a fixed path for decision makers. Because the 
technique does not allow for management flexibility, it necessarily simplifies what could be 
extremely complex multi-stage decisions into a simple progression of actions. This inability to 
react to changing conditions by reanalyzing decisions or even breaking them into multiple stages 
is a weakness than can be addressed by the use of Real Options Analysis (Kodukula and 
Papudesu, 2006). 
 The discount rate used for the NPV analyses in this research is 12%. There is support in 
the literature for using either 10% (Aden et al., 2002; Short et al., 1995) or 12% (Wyman et al. 
1993; Goldemberg et al., 1993) for renewable energy projects in general and cellulosic ethanol 
production specifically. The higher figure was chosen as the more conservative estimate, and a 




The immaturity of the cellulosic ethanol industry presents a data-availability problem that puts 
some quantitative methods out of reach. However, this problem is ideally suited to the 
application of simulation techniques. Additionally, simulation methods can help account for 
random variation in input variables. Basic NPV analysis assumes that input values are 
deterministic and free of random variations. Given the nature of most real-world business 
decisions however, actual inputs are generally probabilistic and can randomly take on large 
ranges or distributions of values. Monte Carlo simulation is a technique via which an analyst can 
examine the behavior of a system over a very large number of such values (Boyle, 1977). In 
addition, as Rose (1998) says, “Monte Carlo simulation can be used to value complex real 
options whose payoffs are dependent on a project‟s cash flows,” which is exactly how such 
simulation techniques are used in this model. 
Richardson, Klose, and Gray (2000) provide a framework for how to handle some of the 
challenges of agricultural simulation models. A major issue with agricultural data is the 
availability of data collected while the same operational conditions apply. Such conditions 
include policy regimes, management practices, and farm or processor practices. Richardson 
(2002) indicates that 20 or more comparable observations are needed to show a distribution is 
normal, something not likely to be possible for most of the agricultural data for this study. 
Additionally, to account for the likely correlation of two or more random variables, a 
multivariate empirical (MVE) distribution will be needed (Richardson and Condra, 1978). While 
Richardson, Klose, and Gray (2000) suggest that the MVE distribution would be a good 
approach for those variables for which there is at least a moderate amount of data, a triangular or 




Risk and uncertainty are not new concepts to producers and processors operating in the 
agricultural sector. Over the years, they have employed various risk management tools and 
strategies to help mitigate risk. Some of those tools are options and futures markets, marketing 
contracts, production contracts, crop insurance, and participation in governmental programs. 
These tools help them manage both input cost and output prices. A more difficult situation arises 
when producers and processors have to figure out how to manage uncertainty.  
Tools and strategies for producers and processors to handle uncertainty are far less 
developed when compared to risk management tools and strategies. One method that has been 
gaining traction in many industries for evaluating uncertainty and which shows promise in the 
agricultural sector is Real Options Analysis (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Amran and Kulatilaka, 
1999; Boehlje, 2003). The objective of this study is to use Real Options Analysis to evaluate the 
uncertainty surrounding the development of the cellulosic ethanol industry in Louisiana, which 
has significant potential to produce biomass that can be converted to ethanol via the cellulosic 
production process.  
For this industry to develop it is going to take a significant investment by cellulosic 
ethanol processors, in terms of both capital investments and long-term contracts with producers. 
Currently, the ethanol industry is receiving subsidies for the production of ethanol as well as  
protection, via tariffs from imports, and mandates. This makes ethanol production a more 
attractive investment, but one that is still clouded by uncertainty. These types of protectionary 
measures are typically used to help protect infant industries (Johnson and Runge, 2007). 
Historically, the infant industry argument has been made and accepted as an exception to the 
rationale for free trade (Sheldon, 2008). It is likely that, at some point in the future, typically 
when the industry has become economically viable, the subsidies, tariffs, and mandates will be 
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removed. This introduces two additional sources of uncertainty for processor and producers 
interested in the Louisiana cellulosic ethanol market: 1.) When will the ethanol industry be 
deemed viable? and 2.) In what manner and at what speed will the removal of the subsidies and 
governmental protection occur? 
  Since cellulosic ethanol is currently not cost competitive when compared to conventional 
ethanol, potential processors are dependent upon these subsidies remaining in place, at least for 
the foreseeable future, until substantial gains in reducing input costs are achieved (Wyman, 
2007). In recent years, subsidies were removed from biodiesel, even before it reached the 
maturity level of ethanol, which further compounds the uncertainty surrounding government 
support of the industry. Though the tax credit was later replaced, producing firms suffered from 
the effects of an uncertain future, and many shut down either temporarily or permanently 
(Gerpen, 2005).  
The model developed in the third objective section can serve as a decision tool for 
processors who need to examine a variety of future scenarios to help them determine under what 
conditions they are willing to make an investment in the cellulosic ethanol industry. More 
importantly, this model can likely serve as a framework for Real Options Analysis in other infant 
agricultural industries. 
Real Options Analysis 
A real option can be defined as “a right – not an obligation – to take an action … on an 
underlying non-financial asset at a predetermined cost on or before a predetermined date” 
(Kodukula and Papudesu, 2006). Purchasing a real option (by making some investment) 
essentially guarantees the purchaser the exclusive right to a particular price for some asset or 
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project. In the absence of the initial investment, the project would either be impossible, or 
available at a significantly different price. 
 If conditions do not change between the purchase and exercise of an option, then the 
outcome is the same as if the situation were a predetermined path as is assumed in NPV analysis. 
However, “Between now and the time of decision, market conditions will change unpredictably, 
making one or the other of the available decisions better for us, and we will have the right to take 
whatever decision will suit us best at the time” (Howell et al, 2001). 
 According to Courtney (2001), a growth option is one which grants the firm the right to 
capture future upside potential via expansion, and a learning option is one with grants the firm 
the right to postpone a future investment until more information is available. The expansion 
option studied in this research is a combination of these two option types. In using a real options 
approach, this model provides a better idea of how a flexible plant manager would actually react 
to new information gained between the purchase of the option to expand and the exercise (or 
expiration) of that option. DCF and NPV analysis “mechanistically discount back expected cash 
flows, while ROV [Real Options Valuation] starts at the end of the decision tree and works back 
one decision at a time, always asking, „What would an intelligent manager choose to do at this 
point given the flexibility to reoptimize?‟” (Courtney, 2001). 
Sensitivity Analysis 
When developing a linear programming model or a simulation model, assumptions are made 
about some of the parameters in order to solve the model within the specified constraints. In 
reality, these assumed-known parameters are simply predictions about future states. To account 
for the fact that these predictions cannot actually be relied upon, some tests should be conducted 
to see how the model might be affected if some of these parameters took on other values. 
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According to Hillier and Lieberman (2005), sensitivity analysis serves exactly this function. 
Conducting such an analysis on the various models built in this research will demonstrate which 
variables cannot be changed without changing the solution. It will also show over what ranges 
other variables can vary without affecting our model solutions. This is valuable not only to show 
which variables must be watched most closely, but also to show how robust the model is to 
changes in certain market conditions, or how vulnerable. In addition, sensitivity analysis can 
provide a more complete picture of the value of a real option and its robustness to various 
parameter shocks.   
The models used to study the objectives in this research all built upon one another and as 
such, rely on the same sources for all the data that they share in their overlapping portions. The 
methodologies used to study each objective are also related, but the full details are herein broken 
down by objective. 
Objective 1 Methods – The Stand Alone Plant 
One method to approach the study of a standalone cellulosic ethanol plant would be to start with 
the waste feedstock (bagasse) and add feedstocks as producers see that the plant represents a 
viable partner. This requires a model that dynamically switches feedstocks from year to year, in 
addition to the within-year switching modeled here. However, while the model is capable of 
year-to-year feedstock switching, for the sake of simplicity, the standalone plant is limited to 
three potential feedstock scenarios which are examined separately: 1) a plant running entirely on 
bagasse sourced from multiple sugar mills, 2) a plant that sources bagasse from multiple mills 
and also has supplier(s) of a fairly low-commitment feedstock (sweet sorghum), and 3) a plant 
that has sweet sorghum supplier(s), at least two bagasse suppliers, and long-term-contracted 
supplier(s) for energy cane. For each scenario, the net present value (NPV) is simulated based on 
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the model detailed in the next objective‟s section. A sensitivity analysis is performed to 
determine how the different scenarios respond to changes in different operational parameters. 
Determination of Plant Size 
A conservative estimate is that the representative Louisiana sugar mill grinds 10,000 wet tons of 
sugarcane a day. This produces about 1,000 dry tons of bagasse each day, about 80-85% of 
which is burned to supply all the steam power that is needed to run the mill. The remaining 
bagasse (estimated to be about 150-200 dry tons) is excess, and must be disposed of. Because 
this excess bagasse represents a waste product, most mills run their boilers very inefficiently 
and/or let off excess steam, so as to burn off as much total bagasse as possible (Day, 2010).  
Based on the above, a relatively small plant size of 10 million gallons per year with an 
estimated yield of 85 gallons of ethanol per dry ton of bagasse, about 300 dry tons of bagasse per 
day could supply the plant‟s input needs. If bagasse is used as it comes in throughout the 90-day 
Louisiana sugarcane harvest season, the plant could stay supplied if it could source bagasse from 
two or three sugar mills.  
Scenario 1 – Ethanol From Bagasse 
 
Sourcing bagasse from seven or eight sugar mills would provide enough bagasse to 
operate the 10 million gallon facility at full capacity for a year. This would be a feasible solution 
in the short run, but competition for the bagasse is assumed to eventually drive prices upwards to 
the point that a 100% bagasse plant is not considered sustainable in the long run. 
Scenario 2 – Ethanol From Bagasse and Sweet Sorghum 
 
The second scenario represents one wherein the low-commitment feedstock (i.e. sweet 
sorghum) is contracted. With 6,000 acres planted, 1,000 tons of sweet sorghum is brought in per 
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day during its July-September harvest window, and the remaining three quarters of the year the 
plant is still run on bagasse. 
Scenario 3 – Ethanol From Bagasse, Sweet Sorghum, and Energy Cane 
 
The third scenario adds 6,000 acres of energy cane. These acres will supply about 2,200 
tons of cane per day for the planned 90-day harvest. The fiber is stored and conventional ethanol 
is produced from the juice during this period. In the following quarter, the stored fiber is used to 
make cellulosic ethanol. Sweet sorghum is harvested during its summer quarter and bagasse is 
purchased and processed during the sugarcane harvest quarter. This is currently considered to be 
the most stable long-run case, involving the least amount of storage costs and losses, as well as 
the most diversified feedstock portfolio. The three scenarios are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1- Diagram of Scenarios and Quarters For Ethanol Plant Feedstocks 
 January-March April-June July-September 
October-
December 
Scenario 1 Bagasse Bagasse Bagasse Bagasse 
Scenario 2 Bagasse Bagasse Sweet Sorghum Bagasse 
Scenario 3 Energy Cane Energy Cane Sweet Sorghum Bagasse 
  
Data 
The cellulosic ethanol plant cost data is adapted from that in an NREL study, an Oklahoma State 
model, and from personal interviews (Aden 2002; Holcomb, 2009; Day, 2010). The plant uses a 
lime-based pretreatment process, and grows its own enzymes using a quantity of reserved 
biomass. Fermentation is done in batches, and distillation is continuous. The waste stream from 
distillation, or vinasse, is processed in an anaerobic digester. This produces three additional 
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streams, biogas, landfillable solids, and a liquid stream. The liquids are further processed in an 
aerobic digester, producing additional biogas and a final solid waste.   
The final waste, landfillable solids and biogas are all burned in a boiler/turbogenerator 
using a Circulating Fluidized Bed Combustor (CFBC), which is optimal for its capability to burn 
a wide range of materials indiscriminately. There are two additional waste streams that have 
potential value, the lignin released during pretreatment and the primarily-yeast solid residue from 
the fermentation stage. Both are potentially marketable, but as no proven market value can really 
be relied on, both are instead considered to be burned in the boiler as well. This CFBC boiler 
generates more than enough steam power to run the entire plant. The excess power could 
hypothetically be sold back to the local grid, but it is currently assumed that that will not happen. 
Sugarcane bagasse is (on a dry matter basis) composed of about 60% carbohydrates 
(cellulose and hemicellulose) and the remainder is lignin and other solids. Those carbohydrates 
can, via pretreatment and enzymatic hydrolysis, be converted to fermentable sugars. Once these 
sugars are obtained, fermentation and distillation of ethanol follow the familiar pattern common 
to other ethanol processes. One mole of these sugars produces one half mole of ethanol and one 
half mole of carbon dioxide, so the stoichiometric yield is theoretically 91.1 gallons per dry ton. 
However, due to losses and inefficiencies, the real-world yield is about 85 gallons per ton and 
this is the figure used (Day, 2010).   
Based on the sucrose content of energy cane and the yield for sucrose syrup, the juice 
from energy cane is expected to produce 12.7 gallons per ton of cane (Salassi, 2006). Based on a 
fiber percentage of 15%, the energy cane fiber is estimated to yield 11.9 gallons of cellulosic 
ethanol per ton. By a similar process, sorghum is estimated to yield 14 gallons of juice ethanol 
and 10.3 gallons of cellulosic ethanol per ton. The expected yields are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2 - Expected Crop and Ethanol  Yields 
 Bagasse Energy Cane Sweet Sorghum 
Yield n/a 35 tons/acre 15 tons/acre 
Gallons/Ton 
Juice Ethanol 




85 gal/dry ton 11.89 gal/wet ton 10.3 gal/wet ton 
  
These yields are presented for illustrative purposes and were used as a benchmark to 
check the forecasted yields that were produced by the stochastic model detailed in the next 
section. When running the simulations for all three objectives, yields were stochastic and 
forecasted using the regression models. Ethanol prices for this model were also taken from the 
stochastic model detailed in the next section. Gasoline denaturant prices are taken from EIA 
projections. Denaturant is blended at 4.76% of total volume, as per RFA (RFA, 2003). 
Stand Alone Cellulosic Ethanol Plant Model 
For the first objective, the model needed to incorporate all operations for a cellulosic ethanol 
plant running on any combination of three possible feedstocks: bagasse, energy cane, and sweet 
sorghum. The model is specified as follows. 
GROSS PROFIT = SALES – COST OF SALES  (2a) 
NET INCOME = GROSS PROFIT – FACTORY EXPENSES (2b) 
 where  SALES = revenues from ethanol 
   COST OF SALES = inventory and shipping costs  
   FACTORY EXPENSES = costs of operation and factors of production 
The supporting equations are 
SALES =   (BAGTONS x ETH/BAG x EP) (3) 
+ (ECTONS x ETH/EC x EP) 
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+ (SSTONS x ETH/SS x EP) 
 
where  EP = ethanol price 
BAGTONS = Bagasse processed (dry tons) 
ETH/BAG = gallons of ethanol per dry ton of bagasse (gal/ton) 
ECTONS = tons of energy cane processed (wet tons) 
ETH/EC = gallons of ethanol per wet ton of energy cane (gal/ton) 
SSTONS = tons of sweet sorghum processed (wet tons) 
ETH/SS = gallons of ethanol per wet ton of sweet sorghum (gal/ton) 
 
COSTOFSALES =    (4) 
  (ECTONS x ETH/EC x EP x GSHRETH) 
  + (SSTONS x ETH/SS x EP x GSHRETH) 
+ (ECTONS x CANEFREIGHT) 
  + (SSTONS x CANEFREIGHT) 
  + DENATURANTCOST 
 
where  CANEFREIGHT = hauling rate for crops ($/ton) 
ECTONS = tons of energy cane processed (wet tons) 
ETH/EC = gallons of ethanol per wet ton of energy cane (gal/ton) 
SSTONS = tons of sweet sorghum processed (wet tons) 
GSHRETH = grower‟s share of ethanol 
ETH/SS = gallons of ethanol per wet ton of sweet sorghum (gal/ton) 




FACTORYEXPENSES =   (5) 
GRINDING COSTS + OFFSEASON COSTS  
+ CELLETHCOSTS 
 
GRINDING COSTS = [(ECTONS/GRDRATE) + (SSTONS/GRDRATE)]  
 x  GRDCOST (6a) 
CELLETH COSTS =   ETH EMPLOY + ETH ADMIN + ETH DEPREC   (6b) 
 
where  ECTONS = tons of energy cane processed (wet tons) 
SSTONS = tons of sweet sorghum processed (wet tons) 
 GRDRATE = grinding rate per day (tons/day) 
  GRDCOST = grinding cost per day ($/day) 
  OFFSEASON = off season expenses ($/season) 
  ETH EMPLOY = employee expenses for cellulosic ethanol ($/season)  
   ETH ADMIN = admin. expenses for cellulosic ethanol ($/season) 
   ETH DEPREC = depreciation for cellulosic ethanol ($/season) 
Objective 2 Methods – The Collocated Plant 
Having studied a simulated stand-alone cellulosic ethanol plant operating in south Louisiana, the 
next step was to examine how that facility might benefit from being collocated with a sugar mill. 
The second hypothesis tested is whether a sugarcane mill with a built-in ethanol plant would 
generate any added value from producing either third-strike or “Brazilian-style” sugar ethanol or 
cellulosic ethanol from bagasse. The problem is that no such mill exists.  
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The first step then is to build a simulation model to approximate the operations of a sugar 
mill. Additionally, a simulation of a conventional ethanol facility is added on to the sugar mill 
model. This facility has the capability to process simple sugars into ethanol. The first two strikes 
of raw sugar remain untouched, and the cane juice after the second strike can be used as an 
ethanol feedstock. The time period studied covers 25 years, the limit of EIA‟s forecasts for some 
important inputs like natural gas and crude oil.  
Collocated Ethanol and Sugar Mill Model 
The entire mill and ethanol models are built in Microsoft Excel, and Simetar is used for all 
simulation operations. The MVE model is made up of prices and yields for sugarcane, as well as 
ethanol and oil prices and yields for energy crops. Molasses data is sparse, so a Gray, 
Richardson, Klose, and Schuman (GRKS) distribution is employed (Richardson, 2006). 
Commercial-recoverable sugar (CRS) is simulated using an empirical distribution built from 20 
years of historical data. Following Salassi (2008), the actual formulas driving the mill simulation 
are: 
GROSS PROFIT = SALES – COST OF SALES  (7a) 
NET INCOME = GROSS PROFIT – FACTORY EXPENSES (7b) 
 where  SALES = revenues from sugar, molasses, and ethanol 
   COST OF SALES = inventory and shipping costs  
   FACTORY EXPENSES = costs of operation and factors of production 
The supporting equations are 
 
SALES =   (TONS  x  CRS  x  SP)    (8) 
+  (TONS  x  MOL/TON  x  MP)  
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+ (TONS x CRS x 3STRSUG x CONVFAC x EP) 
+ (TONS x BAGEX x ETH/BAG x EP) 
+ (ECTONS x ETH/EC x EP) 
+ (SSTONS x ETH/SS x EP) 
 
where  TONS = tons of sugarcane processed (tons) 
  CRS = commercial recoverable sugar (lbs/ton) 
SP = raw sugar market price ($/lb) 
  MOL/TON = molasses production rate (gal/ton) 
  MP = molasses market price ($/gal) 
  3STRSUG = estimated sugar in the third strike (%) 
  CONVFAC = gallons of ethanol obtained from a pound of sugar (gal/lb) 
  EP = ethanol price 
BAGEX = Excess Bagasse Percentage (dry ton rate) 
ETH/BAG = gallons of ethanol per dry ton of bagasse (gal/ton) 
ECTONS = tons of energy cane processed (wet tons) 
ETH/EC = gallons of ethanol per wet ton of energy cane (gal/ton) 
SSTONS = tons of sweet sorghum processed (wet tons) 
ETH/SS = gallons of ethanol per wet ton of sweet sorghum (gal/ton) 
 
COSTOFSALES =     (9)  
  [(TONS  x  TRS  x  LQF  x  SP  x  GSHRS)     
  + (TONS  x  MOL/TON  x  MP  x  GSHRM)] 
  + (TONS  x  CANEFREIGHT) 
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  + (TONS  x  SUGFREIGHT) 
  + [(ECTONS x ETH/EC x EP x GSHRETH) 
  + (SSTONS x ETH/SS x EP x GSHRETH)] 
  + (ECTONS x CANEFREIGHT) 
  + (SSTONS x CANEFREIGHT) 
  + DENATURANT 
 
where  TONS = tons of sugarcane processed (tons) 
  TRS = theoretical recoverable sugar (lbs/ton) 
  LQF = liquidation factor (%) 
  SP = raw sugar market price ($/lb) 
  GSHRS = grower‟s share of sugar 
  MOL/TON = molasses production rate (gal/ton) 
  MP = molasses market price ($/gal) 
  GSHRM = grower‟s share of molasses 
  CANEFREIGHT = hauling rate for crops ($/ton) 
  SUGFREIGHT = raw sugar freight rate ($/ton)  
ECTONS = tons of energy cane processed (wet tons) 
ETH/EC = gallons of ethanol per wet ton of energy cane (gal/ton) 
SSTONS = tons of sweet sorghum processed (wet tons) 
GSHRETH = grower‟s share of ethanol 
ETH/SS = gallons of ethanol per wet ton of sweet sorghum (gal/ton) 




FACTORYEXPENSES =   (10) 
GRINDING COSTS + OFFSEASON COSTS  
+  EMPLOY COSTS  + ADMIN COSTS  
+  DEPREC COSTS + COETHCOSTS + CELLETHCOSTS 
 
GRINDING COSTS = [(TONS/GRDRATE) + (ECTONS/GRDRATE)  
 + (SSTONS/GRDRATE)] x  GRDCOST (11a) 
 
COETH COSTS = COETH EMPLOY + COETH ADMIN + COETH DEPREC (11b) 
CELLETH COSTS =   ETH EMPLOY + ETH ADMIN + ETH DEPREC   (11c) 
where   
TONS = tons of sugarcane processed (tons) 
  GRDRATE = grinding rate per day (tons/day) 
ECTONS = tons of energy cane processed (wet tons) 
SSTONS = tons of sweet sorghum processed (wet tons) 
GRDCOST = grinding cost per day ($/day) 
  OFFSEASON = off season expenses ($/season) 
  EMPLOY = employee expenses ($/season) 
  ADMIN = administrative expenses ($/season) 
  DEPREC = depreciation expenses ($/season) 
   COETH EMPLOY = employee expenses for  conv. ethanol ($/season)  
   COETH ADMIN = admin. expenses for conv. ethanol ($/season) 
   COETH DEPREC = depreciation for conv. ethanol ($/season) 
ETH EMPLOY = employee expenses for cellulosic ethanol ($/season)  
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   ETH ADMIN = admin. expenses for cellulosic ethanol ($/season) 
   ETH DEPREC = depreciation for cellulosic ethanol ($/season) 
 
Some factors affecting the performance of the simulated mill are summarized in Table 3. 
Note that, since commercial recoverable sugar (CRS) is equal to theoretical recoverable sugar 
(TRS) times liquidation factor (LQF), only CRS needs to actually be simulated. This CRS term 
is broken down into TRS times LQF under Cost of Sales simply because this is how producers 
are traditionally paid out, first based on an estimated TRS, then on a corrected basis based on 
LQF at the end of the season. The net amount is the same as the CRS used to calculate sales. The 
general sugar mill parameters were inflated at 1% per year for the reported results, but were 
tested for levels from 1-5%. Each additional percentage point increase resulted in a roughly 1% 
decline in mean NPV value.  
The outputs of the mill are raw sugar, molasses, ethanol, and bagasse. The operations of 
the mill itself are based on existing mills, with data gathered from personal interviews 
(Schudmak, 2009) and production studies (Salassi and Deliberto, 2010). On the output side, 
sugar and molasses prices come from ERS, bagasse prices are taken from NREL, and EIA 
supplies ethanol prices. Natural gas prices come from EIA and prices for energy crops are based 
on prior studies about crop pricing strategies for energy cane. Summary statistics and sources for 
data are listed in Table 4.  
The forecasted yields for sugarcane, energy cane, and sweet sorghum follow the basic 
formula relating yields to the price of fertilizer. Natural gas is used as a proxy for nitrogen 
fertilizers since sufficient projections are available from EIA. These natural gas prices were also 
tested with lags up to three years for the perennial crops, but the differences were minimal and 
47 
 
the lower quality of older data meant that choosing non-lagged natural gas prices made for a 
higher quality forecast. 
 
Table 3 - Simulation Factors 
Factor Initial Value Changes 
Tons of sugarcane processed 
(TONS) 
N/A A function of forecasted 
sugarcane yield/acre. Acres are 
held constant. 
Sugar recovery (CRS) N/A Simulated with an empirical 
distribution based on 20 years of 
historical data 
Growers‟ share of raw sugar and 
molasses (GSHRS and GSHRM) 
61% and 61% Held constant at 2009 level 
Molasses per ton of sugarcane 
(MOL/TON) 
6 gallons per ton Held constant 
Third strike sugar percentage 
(3STRSUG) 
10% Held constant 
Gallons of ethanol obtained from 
a pound of sugar (CONVFAC) 
0.0705 Held constant 
Excess Bagasse (BAGEX) 15% Held constant 
Gallons of ethanol from dry ton 
of bagasse (ETH/BAG) 
85 gallons per dry ton Held constant 
Hauling rate for sugarcane, 
energy cane, sweet sorghum 
(CANEFREIGHT) 
$1.00 per ton and $0.10 per mile Increases 1-5% per year 
Raw sugar freight rate 
(SUGFREIGHT) 
$2.00 per ton Increases 1-5% per year 
Denaturant, blended at 4.7% of 
ethanol volume 
Wholesale price of unleaded 
gasoline from EIA 
Forecasted gasoline prices from 
EIA 
Grinding rate per day 
(GRDRATE) 
12,000 tons per day Increases 1-5% per year 
Grinding cost per day 
(GRDCOST) 
$38,000 per day Increases 1-5% per year 
Offseason Expenses 
(OFFSEASON) 
$4,000,000 per year Increases 1-5% per year 
Employee Expenses (EMPLOY, 
COETH EMPLOY, and ETH 
EMPLOY) 
$1,000,000 per year for sugar 
mill plus varying amounts for 
each ethanol component, up to 
$4,000,000 per year 
Increases 1-5% per year 
Administrative Expenses 
(ADMIN, COETH ADMIN, 
ETH ADMIN) 
$500,000 per year, plus $0.22 per 
gallon of ethanol produced 
Increases 1-5% per year 
Depreciation Expenses 
(DEPREC, COETH DEPREC, 
ETH DEPREC) 
$1,000,000 per year for sugar 
mill, plus varying amounts for 
each ethanol component, up to 
$7,000,000 per year 
Sugar mill costs increase 1-5% 
per year, the rest are calculated 
using 39 year straight line, 10-





Table 4 - Data Sources and Stats 
Variable Units Mean Stdev Max Min Source 
Historical Sugar Price (Raw) cents/lb 21.36 1.48 24.93 19.09 USDA, 2010 
Historical Sugarcane Yield t/ac 28 2.69 31 23 USDA, 2009 
Forecasted Sugar Price cents/lb 31.04 1.84 39.22 24.4 model 
Historical Commercially 
Recoverable Sugar  
lb/ac 209.1 13.78 229 179 ASCL, 2010 
Historical Sugarcane 
Production Costs less harvest 
$/ac 487 37.63 529 425 Salassi and 
Deliberto, 2010 
Historical Sugarcane Harvest 
costs 
$/t 3.05 0.24 3.31 2.59 Salassi and 
Deliberto, 2010 
Historical Crude Oil Price $/barrel  46.35 23.05 92.33 21.99 EIA, 2010 
Historical wholesale Ethanol 
price 
$/gal 1.79 0.50 2.58 1.12 NEB, 2010 
Forecasted Ethanol Price $/gal 3.41 0.26 4.72 2.24 EIA, 2010; model 
Historical Natural Gas Prices $/1000ft3
 
6.52 1.87 9.67 4.02 EIA, 2010 
Forecasted Natural Gas Prices $/1000ft3
 
6.54 0.35 6.88 6.05 EIA, 2010 
 
Additionally, the crop yields were found to have an AR(1) autoregressive process, so a 
single lag was used, in addition to a time trend. The random deviate generated by the MVE 
model was used to generate noise for the forecasts. The yield equations take the following form: 
 
                                         (12) 
                                         (13) 
                                             (14) 
 
Ethanol prices are forecasted using an AR(1) process as well.  In keeping with historical trends, 
ethanol price was found to be closely correlated to that of oil.  Since EIA maintains projections 
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of the price of oil, it was possible to incorporate that into the forecast equation.  The formula 
takes the following form: 
 
                                                    (15) 
 
Results for the forecast models are summarized in the following tables, and some detailed results 
are in Appendix A. 
Table 5 - OLS Regression Results for Ethanol Price 
Variable Coefficient Standard Errors 
Intercept 0.917* 0.153 
EthanolPricet-1 -0.039 0.150 
t -0.010 0.006 
oilpricet 0.020* 0.003 
N 27  
R
2 
0.831   
*Significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 6 - OLS Regression Results for Sugar Cane Yields 
Variable Coefficient Standard Errors 
Intercept 21.857* 9.908 
SCaneYieldt-1 0.409 0.276 
natgast -.649 0.603 
t 0.096 0.322 




*Significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 7 - OLS Regression Results for Energy Cane Yields  
Variable Coefficient Standard Errors 
Intercept 19.875* 9.154 
ECaneYieldt-1 0.455 0.265 
natgast -1.067* 0.547 
t 0.441 0.288 








Table 8 - OLS Regression Results for Sweet Sorghum Yields 
Variable Coefficient Standard Errors 
Intercept 20.137* 7.503 
SSGyieldt-1 0.173 0.313 
natgast 0.478 0.416 
t -1.016 0.753 




*Significant at the 10% level 
 
With the full simulation model, several different issues are examined. A sensitivity analysis is 
used to examine how the mill is affected by changes in transportation costs as well as the 
expected prices of sugar. This analysis also examines whether or not producing conventional 
ethanol following the Brazilian model can be profitable in the U.S. An extreme case where all 
sugar is diverted to ethanol production is also examined.  
The second part of this objective is to simulate an add-on cellulosic ethanol plant and 
incorporate this into the sugar mill simulation. The cellulosic ethanol plant will be modeled on 
existing plant data from Aden (2002) and Holcomb (2009) and some of the process parameters 
come from personal interviews (Day, 2010). The additional processing cycle means that 
additional input and output prices will be needed. Natural gas prices come from EIA, and 
bagasse prices are taken from NREL. The same basic methodology is followed to study the base 
case, where the mill is able to obtain enough bagasse to run its cellulosic ethanol facility all year. 
Additionally, two other cases are studied, wherein the mill either has to rely solely on its onsite 
bagasse or is able to contract for enough additional bagasse to run for half the year.   
Due to the varied nature of the feedstocks involved in the cellulosic ethanol plants, some 
assumptions must be made about acquisition strategy. It is assumed that, after the first full year 
of production, it will be possible to begin contracting with growers to produce energy crops.  
Production of sweet sorghum, an annual crop, begins in the second year. Planting of energy cane 
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also begins in the second year, but no cane is delivered until the fourth year. To fill out the initial 
10 million gallon capacity plant, the operator can run entirely on stored bagasse for the year, but 
if it is assumed that bagasse is readily available for one quarter of the year, then 3,500 acres of 
sweet sorghum and 5,000 acres of energy cane are enough to supply the rest of the year‟s 
feedstock demand, given average expected yields for both crops. The model reacts dynamically 
to stochastic energy crop yields by adjusting the quantity of bagasse purchased or fiber stored. 
Low yields stimulate the plant to buy additional bagasse from other sugar mills, and higher 
yields result in excess fiber being stored for up to 6 months. A comparison with the previously 
examined standalone mill is made to discover whether there are in fact synergies to be captured 
by collocation. 
Objective 3 Methods – Expanding the Plant Under Uncertainty 
Having tested both conventional and cellulosic ethanol plants collocated with a sugar mill, for 
the third objective the research question moves on to studying the risk and uncertainty that are 
involved in the business decisions that such a facility would face. The third hypothesis to be 
tested is whether a sugarcane mill with a built-in cellulosic ethanol plant could profitably use real 
options analysis to help make strategic decisions about future production capacity in an 
environment of uncertainty.  
The first step is to build upon the previously developed model of a sugar mill collocated 
with a small-scale cellulosic ethanol plant. A simulation of a commercial-scale expanded 
cellulosic ethanol facility is added on to the initial model, and the entire model is rebuilt to be 
able to respond dynamically to introduced risk and uncertainty. This facility has the capability to 
process cellulosic feedstocks into ethanol. This cellulosic ethanol plant, like the smaller initial 
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plant, will be modeled on existing plant data from Aden (2002) and Holcomb (2009) and some 
of the process parameters come from personal interviews (Day, 2010).  
Assumptions about feedstock acquisition for the smaller capacity plant were given for 
Objective 2. For the expanded 70 million gallon plant, the feedstock assumptions change 
slightly. At that capacity, there would not be enough excess bagasse in the entire state to fill out 
an entire year‟s worth of production, so the plant will be much more dependent on the harvested 
feedstocks. Given expected yields, 20,000 acres of sweet sorghum and about 35,000 acres of 
energy cane should provide enough fiber for the plant to run at between 70% and 85% capacity, 
and the remaining capacity is assumed to be filled with onsite and purchased bagasse, of which 
there should be sufficient quantity to produce at or near full capacity during a normal year. 
The option to expand the plant to the 70 million gallon capacity is a European call option 
to expand. This means that the holder of the option has purchased the right, but not the 
obligation, to expand the plant on a single pre-defined point in time, or expiration date. The 
purchase price will be discussed below. At time of exercise, the value of the basic option can be 
given by: 
 
              (16) 
 
where V is the value of the expansion option, S is the value of the underlying asset, which is the 
revenue stream generated by the expanded plant, and X is the exercise or strike price, which is 
the cost of building and operating the expansion. This term, S - X is effectively the net present 
value of the expansion at the time of the expiration of the option. Given that a smaller version of 
the plant already exists at the time of exercise, the actual value of the expansion option for a 




                 (17) 
 
where NPVx is the value of the expanded plant and NPVo is the value of the original plant, both 
calculated at the time of expiration. The option is considered in the money if the value is 
positive. Since the real option value (ROV) is driven by the underlying NPV model, this value 
can be simulated over thousands of iterations and the mean and standard deviation analyzed over 
different scenarios and parameter assumptions. 
 The option price or premium is the irreversible investment made to purchase the right to 
buy the underlying asset. In this case, in order to be able to profitably build and operate the 
expanded ethanol plant, the operator must contract with growers of energy cane two years prior 
to the start of construction, which is the expiration date of the option. The cost of this contract is 
the option price. Given the high level of risk inherent in planting a perennial crop with no 
alternative market, the risk premium to convince growers to commit large amounts of land to 
energy cane should be very high. Based on existing contracting habits, it is assumed that the 
growers will have to be guaranteed at least the same level of expected revenue that would have 
been realized had they planted their acreage with sugarcane instead of energy cane. For this 
reason, the contract takes the form of a guaranteed payment over the contracted period equal to 
the greater of the present value of the energy cane revenue or the present value of the sacrificed 
sugarcane revenue. If the option is not exercised, the grower will cease production of the energy 
cane and return all contracted acres to sugarcane, which the mill will buy, realizing a small 






















                         
 
   
  
                        
 








                                      
                         
 
   
             
 
   
                     
  
where (18) 
n is the length of contract (seven years in this example) 
PriceECt is the price of energy cane in period t 
QuantityEECt is the quantity of energy cane harvested in period t from the expanded  
acres 
PriceSCt is the price of sugarcane in period t 
QuantityESCt is the quantity of sugarcane that would have been harvested from the 
expansion-contracted acres in period t if the total acreage had been in sugarcane 
from t=0. This represents the sacrificed sugar revenue that the grower would have 
realized if the expanded acres had stayed in sugarcane instead of moving to 
energy cane. 
RevenueMSCt is the sugar revenue realized on the marginal sugarcane grown at the end 
of the contract from the acres that were contracted for energy cane 
The prices and quantity figures are given by: 
                          (19) 
                              (20) 
                                            (21) 
                                            (22) 
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 In addition, the mill equations are somewhat changed. The changes are highlighted below 
in bold print. 
GROSS PROFIT = SALES – COST OF SALES  (23a) 
NET INCOME = GROSS PROFIT – FACTORY EXPENSES – CAPITAL COSTS(23b) 
 where  SALES = revenues from sugar, molasses, and ethanol 
   COST OF SALES = inventory and shipping costs  
   FACTORY EXPENSES = costs of operation and factors of production 
CAPITAL COSTS = purchase and depreciation costs from building the 
plant expansion 
The supporting equation “COSTOFSALES” is now: 
COSTOFSALES =     (24) 
  [(TONS  x  TRS  x  LQF  x  SP  x  GSHRS)     
  + (TONS  x  MOL/TON  x  MP  x  GSHRM)] 
  + (TONS  x  CANEFREIGHT) 
  + (TONS  x  SUGFREIGHT) 
  + [(ECTONS x ETH/EC x EP x GSHRETH) 
  + (SSTONS x ETH/SS x EP x GSHRETH)] 
  + (ECTONS x CANEFREIGHT) 
  + (SSTONS x CANEFREIGHT) 
  + DENATURANTCOSTS 
  + SACRIFICE COSTS 
 
where   
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SACRIFICE COSTS = costs incurred if expanded feedstock acres are contracted 
for but the expansion is not built 
 
Economic Shocks to the Collocated Ethanol Plant 
In previous research it has been shown that a collocated mill of this sort facing the assumed 
production parameters and market conditions will always show a positive NPV in the absence of 
some exogenous shocks to the system. Given that situation, studying positive shocks to the 
system is of little value as the expansion option will always be exercised and the ROV will be 
zero. Instead, three different types of negative shocks have been designed to study this real 
options problem: 
1. The price of oil significantly underperforms relative to market forecasts 
2. The direct federal ethanol subsidy is eliminated 
3. The price of sugar significantly exceeds expectations 
If any of these shocks happens between the time at which the expansion option is purchased and 
the expiration date of the option, it could significantly change the value of the project and could 
change the decision from a “yes” to a “no.” Cheap oil would significantly depress the price of 
ethanol, thus decreasing revenues and profits of the plant. The elimination of the subsidy, which 
takes the form of a direct payment to blenders of ethanol, would result in a lower price of ethanol 
paid to producers. Finally, if the price of sugar significantly outperforms expectations, the price 
that the plant would have to pay for energy cane would also climb steeply, increasing production 





Figure 7 - A Timeline of the Expansion Option 
 
In the modeled timeline, the expanded feedstock decision happens in the seventh year. This is 
when the option to expand is purchased via the feedstock contract. Between that point and the 
ninth year, if any market or parameter changes indicate that expanding the plant would become a 
losing proposition, the option is allowed to expire, the expansion is not built, and the sacrifice 
costs are incurred. If the ninth year is reached without any expansion trigger turning negative, 
then the option is exercised, the strike (construction) price is paid, and construction begins. 
Roughly two years later, the expanded plant is up and running. Detail of the expansion trigger 
structure is given in Figure 8.  
In this case, each of the triggers is structured such that a “Yes” result from the binary 
question means that the expansion should not be built. If all three triggers remain in the “No” 
state until the expiration/exercise date of the option, then the option is exercised. If even one 







Figure 8 - Flowchart for the Plant Expansion Trigger 
Because there is no information that could dictate the probability of any of these shocks 
occurring, they are each modeled over a range of possible probabilities. The binary values that 




CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The models developed over the course of this research were used to study three different types of 
questions so, while the results are interrelated in content, they are herein broken down by 
objective. The models for each of the objectives were simulated in Simetar over 10,000 iterations 
using the random seed value of 31517, Simetar‟s default value. Results for each will be 
summarized and briefly discussed in this chapter, and conclusions will be offered in Chapter 5. 
 
Objective 1 – Standalone Ethanol Plant 
For the first objective, a standalone cellulosic ethanol facility was modeled and three feedstock 
supply scenarios were examined. Using stochastic input and output parameters, the model was 
simulated over ten thousand iterations. In all of these results tables, the “mean” represents the 
mean value obtained for the NPV of the tested scenario when the simulation is run for thousands 
of iterations. The other summary statistics also relate to those iterated results in the same manner. 
In general, all scenarios had positive NPVs for the twenty-five year time horizon 
examined at a 12% discount rate. Of the three scenarios, the first, using just bagasse sourced 
from local mills, has the highest mean NPV at $29.6 million. As the processor diversifies their 
feedstocks, NPV for the plant decreases, so the second scenario, with the addition of sweet 
sorghum, is the next highest, and the third, which adds energy cane, is the lowest. One 
explanation for this is that as the plant diversifies into other feedstocks, the overall gallons per 
ton of feedstock diminished, since bagasse is the most theoretically-efficient of the feedstocks. In 
addition, scenario one has the least variability in expected NPV, as measured by the coefficient 
of variation (CV). The third scenario has a very high CV, meaning that a risk-averse processor 
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might not take on the project, regardless of its positive NPV. The value of the CV is over 100, 
indicating that the standard deviation of the NPV is larger than the mean, making this a very 
risky project overall. 
 
Table 9 – Standalone Ethanol Plant Feedstock Scenario Net Present Values (NPV) 
 Just Bagasse 
Scenario 
Bagasse and SSorg 
Scenario 
Bagasse, SSorg, and 
ECane Scenario 
Mean $29,600,000 $15,400,000  $4,170,000  
StDev         5,720,000          5,790,000           5,800,000  
CV 19.2 37.6 139 
Min $11,400,000 ($2,810,000) ($14,100,000) 
Max $46,500,000 $32,500,000  $21,200,000  
The large positive expected NPV for the first scenario provides evidence that, under these 
assumptions, the construction of a 10 million gallon per year bagasse ethanol facility would be 
profitable. Furthermore, it would provide an answer for the first mover problem and let the 
processor have additional time to allow feedstock producers to be contracted with for the 
production of alternative feedstocks. The large positive NPV for scenario one also could allow 
for the possibility of transportation costs to rise significantly. This is important because this plant 
is a standalone plant and all feedstocks have to be trucked to the plant from one of the eleven 
sugar mills in the state.    
From this analysis it seems that sweet sorghum may be a good option as a second 
feedstock as shown in scenario two. This is due to several reasons. First, sweet sorghum allows 
the feedstock producers to respond quicker to market signals coming from the ethanol industry 
relative to energy cane. Second, sweet sorghum is capable of producing the same amount of 
ethanol per ton as energy cane, so it is no more vulnerable to pressures like high transportation 
costs per ton. Third, the cost to purchase sweet sorghum is significantly lower if sweet sorghum 
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is being produced on fallow sugarcane lands. If the acres used are not fallow lands, additional 
planting costs would make the cost of this feedstock almost double, decreasing the NPV.  
The third scenario provides the lowest NPV of the scenarios examined. Partially, this is 
because current energy cane varieties are expensive to source because their yields are nearly the 
same as sugarcane. As the genetics for this crop improve and yields are driven up, the cost to 
source this feedstock will fall. According to Mark et al. (2009) energy cane yields could reach 50 
plus tons per acre, reducing their calculated feedstock cost from $27.00 per ton to less than $20. 
The pricing model used in this model bases energy cane prices largely on sugar prices, but the 
principle is similar: higher yields lead to lower costs per ton. Furthermore, one other issue with 
contracting for energy cane is it will reduce the flexibility of the processor and the producer‟s 
ability to respond to changing market conditions. This inflexibility and uncertainty is addressed 
in objective three.  
The main reason the standalone plant seems to suffer from the addition of harvested 
feedstocks is that additional capital expenditure is required to move from pre-ground feedstocks 
like bagasse. Specifically, the plant must invest in grinders and rollers to process either sweet 
sorghum or energy cane, whereas bagasse requires neither. This is part of the rationale that lead 
to the development of a collocation strategy, as detailed in the rest of this research. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Two key drivers to this model are ethanol prices, which determine the expected value of the 
revenue stream, and transportation costs, which are a relatively large cost of production that is 
subject to large-term uncertainty. In general, scenarios one and two are both less responsive to 
either ethanol prices or transportation costs, with scenario one being the most robust to these 
changes overall.   
62 
 
 Given that its primary revenue stream will be the sale of ethanol, it makes sense that 
ethanol price is a key driver of plant profitability. In scenario one, a 15% decrease in average 
projected ethanol prices leads to an 85% decrease in expected NPV, while a 15% increase in 
price leads to an 82.7% increase in expected NPV. 
 
Table 10 –Effect of Ethanol Price Changes on the Bagasse Scenario NPV 
 Base EP 15% decrease in EP 15% increase in EP 
Mean $29,600,000 $4,350,000  $54,200,000  
% diff  -85% 83% 
StDev         5,720,000          4,960,000           6,190,000  
CV 19.3 114 11.4 
Min $11,400,000 ($11,200,000) $34,100,000  
Max $46,500,000 $18,900,000  $71,500,000  
 
For scenario two, the decrease in ethanol price leads to a decrease in NPV of 165.6%, and the 
increase in prices leads to an NPV increase of 161.46%. For scenario three, the numbers are even 
more drastic. A 15% decrease in the price of ethanol leads to a 619.5% decrease in mean 
expected NPV, while a 15% increase leads to a 599% increase in NPV.   
Table 11 - Effect of Ethanol Price Changes on the Bag. + SSorg. Scenario NPV 
 Base EP 15% decrease in EP 15% increase in EP 
Mean $15,400,000  ($10,100,000) $40,300,000  
% diff  -165% 161% 
StDev         5,790,000          4,990,000           6,370,000  
CV 37.6 -49.4 15.8 
Min ($2,820,000) ($25,600,000) $19,800,000  
Max $32,500,000  $4,540,000  $58,700,000  
 
Table 12 - Effect of Ethanol Price Changes on the Bag. + SSorg. + ECane Scenario NPV 
 Base EP 15% decrease in EP 15% increase in EP 
Mean $4,170,000  ($21,600,000) $29,100,000  
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% diff  -619% 599% 
StDev         5,790,000          5,070,000           6,360,000  
CV 139 -23.4 21.8 
Min ($14,100,000) ($37,800,000) $8,590,000  
Max $21,200,000  ($6,860,000) $47,500,000  
 
These numbers show that, as expected, the cellulosic ethanol facility is highly sensitive to 
ethanol prices, regardless of feedstock strategy. However, they also show that, while the 
diversified feedstock strategy represented by scenario three is not likely to be attractive under the 
default assumptions, a 15% increase in ethanol prices makes the strategy significantly more 
attractive. In fact, not only is the NPV much higher, but the CV drops to 21.8, indicating that it is 
a much less risky strategy with these elevated prices that it is under the default assumptions. In 
fact, just a 5% increase in average expected ethanol prices offers significant improvements, 
resulting in a $12.5 million mean NPV and a CV of 47.7. This is encouraging, as there is not 
enough excess bagasse available in the state to be able to obtain commercially-significant 
quantities of cellulosic ethanol without the use of significant levels of energy crops, and energy 
cane is perhaps best situated to fill the gap in the longer term, so scenario three is the one that is 
likely closest to what a commercial plant in Louisiana would look like. Additionally, if cost 
reductions could be realized via strategies like collocation with a sugar mill, this feedstock 
portfolio might be considerably more viable. 
 Lastly, transportation costs are very important for cellulosic ethanol facilities. Given that 
many potential biomass crops are high in moisture content, transportation costs have the 
potential to be a very large driver of production costs and hence profitability. Increasing 
transportation costs for a cellulosic ethanol feedstock can come from two directions. One is an 
increase in the moisture-to-fiber ratio, leading to more weight being transported for the same 
amount of fiber. The crops studied in this research are very high in moisture content, but it 
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comes in the form of juices high in fermentable sugars, so the moisture-to-fiber ratio is 
considerably less important than it would be for some other energy crops like miscanthus or 
switchgrass. More important to this research is the second source of transportation cost 
variability: the cost per truckload. The transportation model for this research is based on the 
actual practices used in the sugarcane industry, in which costs are essentially static on a per-
truck-mile basis. However, the trip cost can increase either by increasing the number of miles 
that each trip averages, or by increasing the per-mile cost. To capture both potential effects at 
once, the value that was varied was the actual per-truckload cost.  
In scenario one, a 15% increase in transportation cost resulted in a 5% decrease in mean 
expected NPV, and vice versa for a decrease in transportation costs. 
Table 13 – Effect of Transportation Costs on Bagasse Scenario NPV 
 Base TCosts 15% decrease in 
TC 
15% increase in 
TC 
Mean $29,600,000 $31,100,000  $28,200,000  
% diff  5.01% -5.02% 
StDev         5,720,000          5,700,000           5,730,000  
CV 19.2 18.3 20.4 
Min $11,400,000 $12,900,000  $9,930,000  
Max $46,500,000 $47,900,000  $45,100,000  
 
For scenario two, a 15% change in transportation costs resulted in an NPV change of 13% in the 
opposite direction. For scenario three, wherein energy cane is the primary feedstock, a 15% 
change in transportation costs resulted in an NPV change of 55% in the opposite direction. In 
addition, while scenario one and two only saw a small increase in variability as measured by CV, 
scenario three saw a very large jump in variability when transportation costs increase. This 
variability is so high that, while NPV is still positive, a risk averse processor would be quite 
unlikely to adopt the project under those circumstances. A 15% decrease in transportation costs, 
however, brings the CV down below 100, making the project considerably more attractive to a 
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risk-averse processor. Again, this shows that the preferred scenario, with diverse feedstocks, is 
not far from being a viable prospect, and if the assumptions in the model are only slightly 
pessimistic in some parameters, this sort of plant might actually be feasible. 
 Each model and scenario in this study was run using a 12% discount rate. This rate was 
sensitivity tested and it was found that each increase of two percentage points resulted in a 
decrease in mean NPV value by 26% from the previous value. 
Table 14 - Effect of Transportation Costs on Bag + SSorg Scenario NPV 
 Base TCosts 15% decrease in TC 15% increase in TC 
Mean $15,400,000  $17,400,00  $13,400,000  
% diff  12.9% -12.9% 
StDev         5,790,000          5,780,000           5,790,000  
CV 37.6 33.2 43.2 
Min ($2,820,000) ($841,000) ($4,790,000) 
Max $32,400,000  $34,500,000  $30,500,000  
 
Table 15 - Effect of Transportation Costs on Bag + SSorg + ECane Scenario NPV 
 Base TCosts 15% decrease in TC 15% increase in TC 
Mean $4,170,000  $6,460,000  $1,870,000  
% diff  54.9% -55.1% 
StDev         5,790,000          5,780,000           5,800,000  
CV 139 89.5 310 
Min ($14,000,000) ($11,700,000) ($16,300,000) 
Max $21,200,000  $23,500,000  $18,900,000  
 
Objective 2 – Collocated Ethanol and Sugar Mill 
For the second objective, a representative Louisiana sugar mill was modeled, and then 
simulations of both a conventional sugar ethanol plant and a cellulosic ethanol plant were added 
to model a collocated bioprocessing facility. 
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In the case of the base sugar mill, the simulation model produces results in line with prior 
expectations. The baseline case for the sugar mill produces an NPV of $28.7 million.  As Table 
16 shows, this proves highly sensitive to sugar prices, especially on the upside.   
Table 16 – Effect of Sugar Price Changes on Standalone Sugar Mill NPV 
 Baseline 10% Decrease 10% Increase 15% Decrease 15% Increase 
Mean  $  28,700,000   $   22,700,000   $  38,600,000   $   22,400,000   $  43,600,000  
StDev  $    2,050,000   $      1,740,000   $    2,300,000   $      1,740,000   $    2,420,000  
CV 7.16 7.69 5.96 7.76 5.56 
Min  $  21,600,000   $   15,300,000   $  30,900,000   $   15,200,000   $  35,500,000  
Max  $  35,200,000   $   28,300,000   $  45,800,000   $   28,200,000   $  51,100,000  
 
A 10% increase in the mean price of sugar produces a 35% increase in NPV, while a 15% 
increase results in an increase of 52%. On the downside, the effects are somewhat different.  
Both a 10% decrease and a 15% decrease in the mean price of sugar result in a roughly 20% 
decrease in NPV. The reason for this mitigation of the downside is the US sugar policy which 
currently has a forfeiture price of 19.81 cents per pound of sugar. When the sugar price trend is 
allowed to drop by large amounts, that forfeiture price is triggered more and more often, so the 
sugar price effectively becomes fixed at 19.81 cents per pound. 
 The mill is much less sensitive to the price of molasses, which is again as expected since 
molasses makes up a much smaller share of a mill‟s revenue. In each scenario tested, the largest 
effect was still less than a 4% change in NPV, as can be seen in Table 17. 
Table 17 – Effect of Molasses Price Changes on Standalone Sugar Mill NPV 
 Baseline 5% Decrease 5% Increase 15% Decrease 15% Increase 
Mean  $  28,700,000   $  28,400,000   $  29,000,000   $   27,700,000   $  29,700,000  
StDev  $    2,050,000   $    2,050,000   $    2,060,000   $      2,040,000   $    2,070,000  
CV 7.16 7.22 7.10 7.35 6.99 
Min  $  21,600,000   $  21,300,000   $  21,900,000   $   20,700,000   $  22,500,000  




In the previous section, results showed that a standalone cellulosic ethanol plant could be highly 
sensitive to changes transportation costs. The sugar mill also has to transport a feedstock with 
high moisture content, and is expected to show some sensitivity to transportation costs.  
However, as Table 18 shows, the effect is relatively minor. 
Table 18 – Effect of Transportation Cost Changes on Standalone Sugar Mill NPV 
 Baseline 5% Decrease 5% increase 10% increase 15% increase 
Mean  $  28,700,000   $  30,300,000   $  27,100,000   $  25,500,000   $  23,800,000  
StDev 2,080,000 2,090,000 2,060,000 2,050,000 2,030,000 
CV 7.26 6.92 7.63 8.06 8.56 
Min  $ 22,200,000   $ 23,800,000   $  20,600,000   $  18,900,000  $  17,300,000 
Max  $ 34,700,000   $ 36,300,000   $  33,000,000   $  31,300,000   $  29,700,000  
 
Table 19 summarizes the results for the two attempts to make Brazilian-style sugar ethanol. As 
can be clearly seen, the value of the project drops precipitously when the third-strike ethanol 
plant is added.   
Table 19 – Summary of Sugar Ethanol Scenario NPVs 
 Sugar Mill Third Strike Ethanol 100% Sugar to Ethanol 
Mean  $        28,700,000   $       (21,700,000)  $       (22,700,000) 
StDev 2,060,000 2,830,000 11,800,000 
CV 7.18 -13.1 -52.0 
Min  $        21,800,000   $       (30,600,000)  $       (57,500,000) 
Max  $        35,200,000   $       (12,500,000)  $          15,800,000  
 
When all of the sugar production is redirected to ethanol, things get even worse. The 
central insight here is that there is so little actual ethanol that can be produced in this manner that 
the add-on ethanol plant cannot generate enough revenue to pay for itself. In Louisiana the sugar 
production season is about 3 months, which is the only period during which the plant would have 
feedstock available. In Brazil, this period lasts at least 6 months in most years. Running at about 
25% capacity, Louisiana‟s mills simply cannot produce enough product to make it worthwhile. 
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The next phase is to examine the collocated cellulosic ethanol plant to see if it performs 
any differently. Tables 14 through 16 summarize the results for three basic scenarios. In Table 
20, the assumption is that the sugar mill is unable to obtain any outside bagasse and so it is 
limited strictly to the excess bagasse produced onsite and not burned for power. This should be 
considered a worst-case scenario. In the case where the ethanol plant is collocated (Sugar & 
Bagasse), the project has a negative NPV.  For a standalone plant running the same amount of 
bagasse (Just Bagasse) the situation is even worse. This project would never go forward unless 
significantly more bagasse were available and contracted for ahead of time. 
Table 20 – Summary for Cellulosic Ethanol Plant NPV at 25% Capacity 
 Just Sugar Sugar & Bagasse Just Bagasse 
Mean  $        28,700,000   $        (12,700,000)  $      (47,500,000) 
StDev 2,060,000 2,910,000 1,200,000 
CV 7.19 -22.9 -2.53 
Min  $        21,800,000   $        (22,200,000)  $      (50,800,000) 
Max  $        35,100,000   $          (2,900,000)  $      (43,700,000) 
 
  
Table 21 summarizes a more realistic scenario.  The assumption underlying this case is 
that the mill has managed to contract for excess bagasse from one or two other mills, securing 
enough feedstock to run the plant at about half capacity.  Unlike with sugar juice, bagasse is a 
feedstock that can be stored for significant amount of time without catastrophic losses from 
degradation. There are some losses during storage, but they are manageable, at less than 1% per 
month. With this additional stored feedstock, the collocated case is much improved over the 
previous scenario.  The project actually does have a positive NPV, but the option to take on the 
project would still have a negative value to a previously-existing sugar mill, as the do-nothing 
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(Just Sugar) case has about $21 million greater value. And again, the standalone case is even 
worse. 
Table 21 - Summary for Cellulosic Ethanol Plant NPV at 50% Capacity 
 Just Sugar Sugar & Bagasse Just Bagasse 
Mean  $        28,700,000   $            7,860,000   $      (25,300,000) 
StDev 2,060,000 3,310,000 2,210,000 
CV 7.18 42.1 -8.71 
Min  $        21,700,000   $          (2,990,000)  $      (31,500,000) 
Max  $        35,100,000   $          19,100,000   $      (18,200,000) 
 
 Finally, Table 22 summarizes the ideal case, and the one that would be most likely to 
occur if this plant were ever built. It is unlikely that funding could be secured for the project 
unless guaranteed feedstocks were contracted for such that the plant could run efficiently.  This 
third case assumes just such a situation, where the ethanol plant can run at or near full capacity.  
The situation here is dramatically different from the previous two cases.  For the collocated 
plant, the NPV is positive and greater than the do-nothing case, meaning the project has positive 
value for a previously-existing sugar mill. The standalone plant from objective one also has a 
positive value, roughly equal to the sugar mill‟s value, coincidentally.   
Table 22 - Summary for Cellulosic Ethanol Plant NPV at Full Capacity 
 Just Sugar Sugar & Bagasse Just Bagasse 
Mean  $        28,600,000   $          60,700,000   $        28,900,000  
StDev 2,060,000 5,570,000 5,510,000 
CV 7.18 9.18 19.0 
Min  $        21,700,000   $          44,700,000   $        12,600,000  
Max  $        35,100,000   $          78,600,000   $        46,400,000  
 
What is especially interesting about this case is that it vividly illustrates the actual value 
of collocation, even for a plant running just on bagasse with no harvested feedstocks. If you take 
the sum of the two standalone plants, and subtract this from the collocated plant, the difference 
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comes out to $3 million. This represents the additional value of producing sugar and bagasse-
ethanol together at the same facility rather than at separate locations. This value comes from two 
primary sources: savings on transportation costs, and the freely available nature of the onsite 
bagasse. It is assumed that all bagasse that comes from an external mill will be purchased, 
whereas the bagasse used from the onsite excess is free. In fact, there is a negative cost 
associated with it due to the avoided cost of landfilling the excess, but for the purposes of this 
model, it was left at zero. There is still a handling cost associated with the local material, but the 
savings from transportation and purchasing is great enough to make a strong case for collocation. 
If the collocated plant were running on harvested feedstocks like energy cane, the value of 
collocation would be even higher, due to the fact that the grinders and rollers needed to 
preprocess the cane are already part of the sugar mill. 
 Finally, Table 23 shows the sensitivity of this collocated plant to the price of ethanol. The 
projected ethanol prices were varied by the percentages shown, and the effects were dramatic. 
For each 5% change in the price of ethanol, the NPV changed by about 13% in the same 
direction. This is as expected.   
Table 23 – Effect of Ethanol Price Changes on Collocated Cellulosic Ethanol Plant NPV 
 Baseline 5% Decrease 5% Increase 15% Decrease 15% Increase 
Mean  $  60,700,000   $  52,800,000   $  68,600,000   $   36,500,000   $    83,900,000  
StDev  $    5,910,000   $    5,810,000   $    5,990,000   $      5,560,000   $       6,190,000  
CV 9.71 11.01 8.74 15.22 7.38 
Min  $  39,200,000   $  32,000,000   $  46,500,000   $   17,500,000   $    60,900,000  
Max  $  82,200,000   $  74,100,000   $  90,300,000   $   57,100,000   $  106,000,000  
 
Table 24 summarizes the same collocated plant‟s sensitivity to the price of sugar. On the upside, 
the plant is still quite sensitive to sugar, though not so much as in the standalone sugar mill case.  
For each 5% increase in mean sugar prices, the NPV increases by about 9%.   
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Table 24 – Effect of Sugar Price Changes on Collocated Cellulosic Ethanol Plant NPV 
 Baseline 5% Decrease 5% Increase 15% Decrease 15% Increase 
Mean  $    60,700,000   $     56,200,000   $   66,100,000   $   53,800,000   $   76,800,000  
StDev  $       5,900,000   $       5,940,000   $     5,820,000   $     5,930,000   $     5,690,000  
CV 9.71 10.56 8.81 11.03 7.41 
Min  $     39,200,000   $     34,000,000   $   45,100,000   $   29,900,000   $   56,400,000  
Max  $     82,200,000   $     77,400,000   $   87,300,000   $   75,300,000   $   97,500,000  
 
On the downside, the sugar forfeit price comes back into play. The first 5% decrease 
reduces NPV by about 7%, but then the decreases in value taper off until they level out at about 
an 11% reduction overall, when sugar price is essentially constant at the forfeiture price. 
Objective 3 – Expanded Ethanol and Sugar Mill Under Uncertainty 
For the third objective, the base model for objective two was used to develop a model of a 
commercial-scale cellulosic ethanol plant with a seventy million gallon annual capacity. To 
enable the research to study strategic decisions under risk, this larger-capacity plant was modeled 
as an optional expansion that could be built upon the existing mill if certain conditions were met. 
Then, systemic shocks were modeled to create conditions of uncertainty under which the 
expansion decision could be examined. 
In the base case, the probabilities of each of the three shocks are set to zero, and so the 
scenario only analyzes the basic risks inherent in agricultural production and commodity 
distribution, but no uncertainty in market conditions. As in the rest of the simulated models, the 
base case was simulated over a 25-year period and the model was run for ten thousand iterations. 
In this base case, the Monte Carlo simulated model produces a baseline NPV of $149.4 million, 
with a range of $115 million to $183 million. The full results for the base case are in Table 25. 
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Table 25 - Expanded Collocated Cellulosic Ethanol Plant NPV without Uncertainty Shocks 
No Shocks - Base Case 
Mean $149,000,000  
StDev $11,100,000  
CV 7.46  
Min $115,000,000  
Max $183,000,000  
   
 Because each of the three tested market shocks are truly uncertain and their likelihood 
cannot be estimated with any accuracy, the shocks were examined at five different levels of 
likelihood: 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95%. Because the pattern was found to be consistent across 
all five levels, only one is presented in full detail. For this, the 25% likelihood case, there are 
three relevant numbers for each shock. One, the No-Option value, represents the value of the 
project when it is considered from the non-flexible vantage point offered by traditional non-
flexible NPV analysis, and can be found on Table 26. The second value is found on Table 27, 
and is the value of the project when management is able to be flexible and allow the expansion 
option to expire if market conditions change between the option purchase and expiration date. 
Finally, Table 28 has the summary statistics for the differences, which describe the value of the 
real option to expand or not. 
 
Table 26 - Summary of the No-Option Scenario NPV with Shocks 
 No-Option case at 25% chance of shocks 
 Oil Price Eth Subsidy Sugar Price 
Mean $114,000,000  $133,000,000  $121,000,000  
StDev $62,500,000  $29,100,000  $49,100,000  
CV 54.5 21.8 40.3 
Min ($50,600,000) $61,500,000  $8,830,000  





Table 27 - Summary of the Real Options Scenario NPV with Shocks 
 Real Option Strategy at 25% chance of shocks 
 Oil Price Eth Subsidy Sugar Price 
Mean $121,000,000  $124,000,000  $132,000,000 
StDev  $    50,600,000   $    44,600,000   $     31,700,000  
CV 41.8 35.8 24.0 
Min $8,280,000  $35,500,000  $65,100,000  
Max $183,000,000  $183,000,000  $183,000,000  
 
Table 28 - Value of the Real Option to expand under 25% shock likelihood 
 Summary Stats of Differences at 25% shock 
 Oil Price Eth Subsidy Sugar Price 
Mean $6,500,000  ($9,480,000) $10,200,000  
StDev $14,000,000  $16,800,000  $18,200,000  
Min ($26,000,000) ($58,300,000) $0.00  
Max $69,100,000  $0.00  $58,900,000  
 
 From these tables, a simple picture can be seen. Firstly, each of the shocks greatly 
reduces the overall value of the project from the base case, which is to be expected.  Each shock 
is designed to negatively impact the simulated plant either by decreasing the value of its revenue 
streams or increasing the costs of producing them. In the case of the oil price shock, the No-
Option case has a value of $114.6 million, while the ROA case has a value of $121.1 million.  As 
Table 28 shows, this means the real option itself has a value of $6.5 million, or stated another 
way, the plant would be willing to pay up to $6.5 million dollars to gain and preserve the 
flexibility to NOT build the plant if market conditions change.  In addition, the coefficient of 
variation of the simulated values decreases from 54.6 to 41.8 by using the ROA strategy.  So not 
only is the project more valuable when flexibility is incorporated, it also has a lower variability 
in value. 
 For the sugar price shock, a similar picture is seen.  The No-Option value is $121.8 
million, the ROA strategy value is $132 million, and the value of the real option is $10.2 million. 
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Also like the oil shock case, the variability of the value drops, from a CV of 40.3 to a CV of 24. 
The somewhat surprising result comes from the case of dropping the federal ethanol subsidy.  As 
mentioned earlier, it was assumed that 100% of the cost of the lost subsidy would be passed on 
to the ethanol producers, so this plant is assumed to be feeling the full brunt of that policy 
change.  However, the results show that this shock causes the project to lose the least value from 
the base certainty case.  And more importantly, the value in the No-Option case is higher than 
that of the ROA strategy case, at $133.8 million versus $124.4 million, giving a real option value 
of -$9.4 million.  This negative value implies that the correct value strategy will always be to 
build the expansion plant, regardless of whether or not the ethanol subsidy is dropped between 
the purchase of the option and its expiration.  In addition, the variability in value is lower for the 
No-Option case, so based on this criterion, it is again always optimal to build the plant, 
regardless of the shock state.  Put another way, if the only expected source of uncertainty were 
the state of the ethanol subsidy, the plant would not be willing to pay anything to gain and retain 
the flexibility to not build the expansion. 
 Tables 29 through 31 have the data for the 25% shock probability case arranged by each 
shock.  Values from the cumulative density function (CDF) for the NPV are also summarized, 
and an interesting picture appears for the oil price shock.  As expected, the values above 25% are 
the same for the Option and Build (no option) cases, and below 25%, the Option case values are 
much higher. The unexpected thing is what happens right at 25%, where the value of the Build 
case is actually higher.   
What this essentially says is that the Build case has a much more severe downside than the 
Option case, and the overall mean expected value is lower, but it does bounce back very quickly 
as you move from worst-case to best-case scenarios, and in fact does so more quickly than the 
Option case. This suggests that the model is extremely sensitive to oil prices, and that care 
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should be taken with respect to forecasting those prices and analyzing the uncertainty around 
them. Indeed, Table 32 shows how sensitive the base model (without shocks) is to oil prices. A 
15% change in average expected oil price results in an expected value change of 30% in the 
same direction.  
Finally, Table 33 has the real option values for each shock across each level of 
likelihood. The pattern is consistent across all levels. The value is positive and increasing with 
probability for the oil and sugar price shocks, and negative and decreasing for the ethanol 
subsidy shock. 
Table 29 – Effect of the Oil Price Shock on project value at 25% likelihood 
Oil Price Shock 
  Must Build Real Option difference 
min ($50,600,000) $8,280,000  $58,900,000  
5% ($7,200,000) $28,800,000  $36,000,000  
25% $80,400,000  $54,300,000  ($26,000,000) 
50% $144,000,000  $144,000,000  $0.00  
75% $154,000,000  $154,000,000  $0.00  
95% $167,000,000  $167,000,000  $0.00  
mean $114,000,000  $121,000,000  $6,500,000  
SD $62,500,000  $50,600,000  ($11,800,000) 
CV 54.5  41.8  (12.7) 
 
Table 30 – Effect of the Ethanol Subsidy Shock on project value at 25% likelihood 
Ethanol Subsidy 
  Build Option difference 
min $61,500,000  $35,500,000  ($25,900,000) 
5% $78,900,000  $44,600,000  ($34,200,000) 
25% $115,000,000  $60,500,000  ($54,900,000) 
50% $144,000,000  $144,000,000  $0.00  
75% $154,000,000  $154,000,000  $0.00  
95% $166,000,000  $166,000,000  $0.00  
mean $133,000,000  $124,000,000  ($9,480,000) 
SD $29,100,000  $44,600,000  $15,400,000  




Table 31 – Effect of the Sugar Price Shock on project value at 25% likelihood 
Sugar Price Shock 
  Build Option difference 
min $8,830,000  $65,100,000  $56,300,000  
5% $29,500,000  $75,500,000  $46,000,000  
25% $67,800,000  $92,100,000  $24,200,000  
50% $144,000,000  $144,000,000  $0.00  
75% $154,000,000  $154,000,000  $0.00  
95% $166,000,000  $166,000,000  $0.00  
mean $121,000,000  $132,000,000  $10,200,000  
SD $49,100,000  $31,700,000  ($17,300,000) 
CV 40.3  24.0  (16.2) 
 
Table 32 – Effect of Oil Price Changes on Collocated Cellulosic Ethanol NPV without 
Shocks 
 Base Model 15% decrease 15% increase 
Mean $149,000,000  $103,000,000  $195,000,000  
% diff  -30.60% 30.4% 
StDev      10,700,000       10,600,000         10,800,000  
CV 7.17 10.2 5.56 
Min $120,000,000  $75,700,000  $165,000,000  
Max $179,000,000  $132,000,000  $225,000,000  
 
Table 33 – Value of Ethanol Plant Expansion Option at tested Shock Likelihoods 
Probability Oil Eth Subsidy Sugar 
0.05 $1,480,000  ($1,970,000) $2,050,000  
0.25 $6,500,000  ($9,480,000) $10,200,000  
0.5 $13,000,000  ($18,700,000) $20,200,000  
0.75 $19,600,000  ($28,100,000) $30,600,000  




CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 By 2022, the United States must grow from producing roughly zero gallons of advanced 
biofuel per year to producing 21 billion gallons per year. In order to reach this capacity, 
significant investments will have to be made in cellulosic ethanol feedstocks and in processing 
capacity. Many different parts of the country offer potential opportunities for development of 
feedstocks and processing capacity, and our domestic fuel needs will require all participating 
markets to use their natural resource endowments and infrastructural advantages to produce the 
feedstocks and fuels for which they are best suited. 
 Louisiana has an agricultural infrastructure that is adept at transporting the vast quantities 
of moisture-dense biomass that will be required to produce cellulosic ethanol. In addition, the 
state has many pre-existing bioprocessing facilities in the form of sugar mills, each of which is 
situated in locations that are ideal for the sourcing of large quantities of feedstocks as well as the 
delivery of large amounts of end products. If a cellulosic ethanol industry could be built to 
coexist profitably with this underlying infrastructure, it could derive synergistic benefits from it 
and in turn provide diversified income streams to local participants in the supply chain. 
 The first question to examine is whether it would be feasible to simply build a standalone 
advanced ethanol plant somewhere within the Louisiana sugar belt and operate on locally-
sourced feedstocks. A representative cellulosic ethanol plant was modeled based on previous 
studies and utilizing an alkaline pretreatment process. The plant was tested with three different 
potential feedstocks: bagasse, sweet sorghum, and energy cane. A net present value analysis 
showed that the plant was economically feasible when using all three feedstocks, just bagasse 
and sweet sorghum, and also when using bagasse alone. Just using bagasse was the most 
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profitable with an NPV of nearly $30 million, bagasse plus sweet sorghum was next with an 
NPV of $15 million, and the combination of all three feedstocks was last, with an NPV of about 
$4 million. In addition to being a more valuable project overall, the just-bagasse plant was also 
more robust to changes in market parameters such as ethanol price and transportation costs. 
However, there is not enough excess bagasse in the state of Louisiana to support more than one 
small or medium sized cellulosic ethanol plant. In addition, while sweet sorghum proved to be 
the least costly of the two harvested feedstocks, it grows far less densely than energy cane, and 
so a vastly-larger number of acres would be required to feed a plant of any given size. Due to 
these two factors, the lowest performing strategy, using all three feedstocks, is the most feasible 
long term strategy. 
 Partly in order to increase the feasibility of using a multiple-feedstock portfolio for a 
Louisiana cellulosic ethanol plant, a representative Louisiana sugar mill was examined as a 
possible place to collocate the ethanol plant. A sugar mill offers synergistic benefits to such an 
ethanol plant from two directions, cost savings via sourcing local bagasse from the mill, and 
capital savings from reusing the grinders to process the energy cane and sweet sorghum. The 
sugar mill was examined by itself, and then in conjunction with a Brazilian-style sugar ethanol 
plant running on the “third strike” of sugar. This was found to be not feasible, which is in line 
with previous research into the subject. When the cellulosic ethanol plant is incorporated into the 
sugar mill model running on bagasse, the cost savings from sourcing local material were found to 
be significant. The plant could not running solely on the excess bagasse produced at the 
collocated sugar mill, but the cost savings were still substantial, amounting to some $3 million of 
value over the course of the simulated time period. The sugar mill was found to be profitable on 
its own, and the ethanol plant was similarly valuable on its own, but the combined operation was 
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the most desired once the plant was able to operate at full capacity. With the ethanol plant 
operating at just half capacity, the combined mill was still profitable, but the standalone sugar 
mill was preferred. 
 Finally, a full-scale cellulosic ethanol plant was examined for potential collocation with a 
Louisiana sugar mill. This larger mill is completely dependent on a diversified feedstock 
portfolio, including bagasse, sweet sorghum, and energy cane. This feedstock group increases the 
value of collocation, since the sugar mill grinders could be used to preprocess both of the 
harvested feedstocks and the existing sugar mill transportation infrastructure could be used for 
feedstock acquisition. However, this larger size and increased exposure to uncertain market 
conditions and production parameters necessitated a reexamination of the risk and uncertainty 
involved in operation of the collocated ethanol plant. Real options analysis was chosen as a tool 
to help study the uncertainty surrounding the decision to expand from the smaller-scale plant 
previously studied to this larger plant with seven times the capacity. In order to study the effects 
of uncertainty, three negative shocks were modeled, and the mill‟s responses were examined to 
place a value on the different strategies. The real option to expand the plant was found to respond 
as expected to two of the three shocks, but counter to expectations for the third shock. That third 
shock was the complete removal of the direct ethanol subsidy, and it was found to unexpectedly 
have no effect on whether or not expanding the plant was the right decision. On the whole, the 
real options strategy saved millions of dollars in value over the traditional decision making tool 
(NPV analysis) when examined over thousands of iterations. In the case of the ethanol subsidy 
shock, the real options strategy lost money, since the option was structured to force the plant not 
to expand in the absence of the subsidy.  
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 The ethanol industry in the United States is centered entirely around corn, the only 
significant feedstock currently in use. However, in order to meet both our national renewable 
fuels mandate and our general need for liquid fuels, our next generation biofuels will need to 
come from multiple different feedstocks. If Louisiana is going to be a participate in this 
advanced biofuel industry, it will need to leverage its unique natural resources and agricultural 
infrastructure to do so competitively. This body of research has shown that producing cellulosic 
ethanol can be an economically viable option for Louisiana, and has also shown that the state 
does have advantages that can be successfully leveraged to increase that viability. 
 There are limitations to this research, and some will need to be addressed to gain a better 
understanding of the future of cellulosic ethanol in Louisiana. Perhaps most importantly, this 
research focused strictly on the processor of the ethanol, and simply assumed that producers of 
the feedstocks could be found if sufficient compensation were offered. While this might be the 
case, it would be helpful to conduct a survey of various producer groups to gauge attitudes and 
willingness to participate in this market. Other factors can play a role in producers‟ decisions 
about what crops to grow, and these could potentially change some of the feedstock realities 
faced by the processor. Additionally, this research assumed that local demand from consumers, 
blenders, and traders would be large enough to ensure that any quantity of ethanol produced 
would have a buyer. In reality, the transportation of ethanol over significant distances can be 
complicated and costly, so securing buyers of the ethanol would be advisable before any 
significant investment were made. As of now, since there is no local production of ethanol, large 
buyers likely do not have the capacity to purchase, blend, and transport the fuel from this area. 
This is unlikely to be an insurmountable issue, but some market research into ethanol buyers 
would help ascertain the seriousness of the situation. 
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 There are other ways that this research can be expanded and developed further. Results 
could be incorporated from prior studies into how a cellulosic ethanol industry could affect the 
crop mix in Louisiana. This would help predict both the viability of any one crop strategy, and 
also might help pick more optimal strategies for any given location. Results from an optimal 
plant location study could help identify which locations in the state would be best to study for 
potential collocation, and some GIS modeling could help give a more complete idea of 
transportation costs for that plant. Additionally, some research on optimal pricing strategies for 
biomass could help determine how much room there is for a plant to increase offered prices if a 
willingness-to-participate study shows that producers are reticent to switch to energy crops. 
 This research is all targeted towards the Louisiana sugar belt, but the analytical 
framework developed in this study could be used to study any region, provided there is at least 
one potentially-viable cellulosic feedstock. Each region is different, and there are almost 
certainly other areas of the country that could benefit from the development of a local cellulosic 
ethanol industry. Stakeholders in this and other regions could use the results from this study or 
the tools developed in this research to help examine potential renewable energy projects in the 
future. Policymakers might find the results of this and future studies useful when considering 
renewable energy needs for the country as well as economic development needs for each region. 
Both the results and the tools developed can help determine how our energy goals can best be 
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APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE SCENARIO BREAKDOWNS 
 
Table 39 - Standalone Cellulosic Ethanol Plant Average Values Over 25 Years and 1,000 
Iterations - Bagasse Only 
SALES 
 Bagasse Ethanol  $     35,772,834.78  
TOTAL GROSS SALES  $     35,772,834.78  
Transportation  $        1,714,055.16  
Feedstock costs  $        6,269,907.76  
Enzyme Costs  $           588,893.49  
Other costs  $        2,210,540.11  
handling and loss  $           125,000.00  
Denaturant Cost  $        2,087,606.35  
TOTAL VARIABLE EXP.  $     12,996,002.86  
TOTAL GROSS MARGIN  $     22,776,831.92  
Salaries  $           807,163.55  
Benefits  $           322,865.42  
Total Labor  $        1,130,028.97  
Production Expenses  $     12,996,002.86  
Total Variable and Conversion 
Costs  $     14,126,031.83  
Maintenance  $        1,092,110.81  
Insurance  $           819,083.11  
Property Tax  $           273,027.70  
Depreciation  $        1,239,073.85  
Interest  $        1,150,222.69  
Total Fixed  $        4,573,518.16  
Supplies  $                6,639.78  
Miscellaneous*  $              10,623.65  
Total Other  $              17,263.42  
TOTAL EXPENSES  $     18,716,813.42  





Table 40 - Standalone Cellulosic Ethanol Plant Average Values Over 25 Years and 1,000 
Iterations - Bagasse and Sweet Sorghum 
SALES 
 Bagasse Ethanol  $     24,763,704.87  
S. Sorghum Ethanol  $     11,009,443.35  
TOTAL GROSS SALES  $     35,773,148.22  
Transportation  $        2,417,075.25  
Feedstock costs  $        5,988,673.77  
Enzyme Costs  $           588,893.49  
Other costs  $        2,047,402.16  
handling and loss  $           125,000.00  
Grinding Costs (ethanol)  $           331,459.40  
Denaturant Cost  $        2,087,624.69  
TOTAL VARIABLE EXP.  $     13,254,669.35  
TOTAL GROSS MARGIN  $     22,518,478.87  
Salaries  $        1,614,327.11  
Benefits  $           645,730.84  
Total Labor  $        2,260,057.95  
Production Expenses  $     13,254,669.35  
Total Variable and Conversion 
Costs  $     15,514,727.30  
Maintenance  $        1,219,594.56  
Insurance  $           914,695.92  
Property Tax  $           304,898.64  
 Depreciation   $        1,239,073.85  
Interest  $        1,284,489.93  
Total Fixed  $        4,962,752.90  
Supplies  $              13,279.56  
Miscellaneous*  $              21,247.29  
Total Other  $              34,526.85  
TOTAL EXPENSES  $     20,512,007.05  





Table 41 - Standalone Cellulosic Ethanol Plant Average Values Over 25 Years and 1,000 
Iterations - Bagasse, Sweet Sorghum, and Energy Cane 
SALES 
 Bagasse Ethanol  $        8,177,075.13  
E. Cane Ethanol  $     16,671,507.92  
S. Sorghum Ethanol  $     11,009,443.35  
TOTAL GROSS SALES  $     35,858,026.40  
Transportation  $        3,061,469.53  
Feedstock costs  $     10,658,974.42  
Enzyme Costs  $           588,893.49  
Other costs  $        1,834,101.23  
handling and loss  $           125,000.00  
Grinding Costs (ethanol)  $           870,759.92  
Denaturant Cost  $        2,092,774.40  
TOTAL VARIABLE EXP.  $     18,361,213.07  
TOTAL GROSS MARGIN  $     17,496,813.32  
Salaries  $        1,614,327.11  
Benefits  $           645,730.84  
Total Labor  $        2,260,057.95  
Production Expenses  $     18,361,213.07  
Total Variable and Conversion 
Costs  $     20,621,271.02  
Maintenance  $        1,219,594.56  
Insurance  $           914,695.92  
Property Tax  $           304,898.64  
 Depreciation   $        1,239,073.85  
Interest  $        1,284,489.93  
Total Fixed  $        4,962,752.90  
Supplies  $              13,279.56  
Miscellaneous*  $              21,247.29  
Total Other  $              34,526.85  
TOTAL EXPENSES  $     25,618,550.77  





Table 42 - Collocated Cellulosic Ethanol Plant Average Values Over 25 Years and 1,000 
Iterations - Bagasse Ethanol and Sugar 
SALES 
 Bagasse Ethanol  $    35,770,669.79  
SUGAR  $    81,444,868.31  
TOTAL GROSS SALES  $  117,207,317.18  
Transportation  $       1,495,118.78  
Feedstock costs  $       5,371,844.26  
Enzyme Costs  $          588,893.49  
Other costs  $       2,210,540.11  
handling and loss  $          125,000.00  
Denaturant Cost  $       2,087,606.35  
SUGAR PRODUCTION  $    56,339,343.81  
TOTAL VARIABLE EXP.  $    68,213,060.07  
TOTAL GROSS MARGIN  $    48,994,257.11  
Salaries  $       1,614,327.11  
Benefits  $          645,730.84  
Total Labor  $       2,260,057.95  
Production Expenses  $    68,213,060.07  
Total Variable and Conversion 
Costs  $    70,473,118.02  
Maintenance  $       1,092,110.81  
Insurance  $          819,083.11  
Property Tax  $          273,027.70  
Depreciation  $       1,239,073.85  
Interest  $       1,150,222.69  
SUGAR MILL  $    11,177,153.91  
Total Fixed  $    15,750,672.07  
Supplies  $             13,279.56  
Miscellaneous*  $             21,247.29  
Total Other  $             34,526.85  
TOTAL EXPENSES  $    86,257,617.37  




Table 43 - Collocated Cellulosic Ethanol Plant Average Values Over 25 Years and 1,000 
Iterations - All-Feedstock Cellulosic Ethanol and Sugar 
SALES 
 Bagasse Ethanol  $       8,177,075.13  
E. Cane Ethanol  $    16,671,507.92  
S. Sorghum Ethanol  $    11,009,443.35  
SUGAR  $    81,472,602.43  
TOTAL GROSS SALES  $  117,330,628.82  
Transportation  $       2,903,489.56  
Feedstock costs  $       9,760,748.16  
Enzyme Costs  $          588,893.49  
Other costs  $       1,834,101.23  
handling and loss  $          125,000.00  
Grinding Costs (ethanol)  $          870,759.92  
Denaturant Cost  $       2,092,774.40  
SUGAR PRODUCTION  $    56,357,196.32  
TOTAL VARIABLE EXP.  $    73,662,203.16  
TOTAL GROSS MARGIN  $    43,668,425.67  
Salaries  $       2,421,490.66  
Benefits  $          968,596.26  
Total Labor  $       3,390,086.92  
Production Expenses  $    73,662,203.16  
Total Variable and Conversion Costs  $    77,052,290.08  
Maintenance  $       1,092,110.81  
Insurance  $          819,083.11  
Property Tax  $          273,027.70  
Depreciation  $       1,239,073.85  
Interest  $       1,150,222.69  
SUGAR MILL  $    11,177,149.08  
Total Fixed  $    15,750,667.24  
Supplies  $             19,919.34  
Miscellaneous*  $             31,870.94  
Total Other  $             51,790.27  
TOTAL EXPENSES  $    92,854,747.59  




Table 44 - Expanded Capacity Collocated Cellulosic Ethanol Plant Average Values Over 25 
Years and 1,000 Iterations - All-Feedstock Cellulosic Ethanol and Sugar 
SALES 
 Bagasse Ethanol  $    31,777,602.97  
E. Cane Ethanol  $    99,817,290.46  
S. Sorghum Ethanol  $    51,620,298.34  
SUGAR  $    81,472,602.43  
TOTAL GROSS SALES  $  264,687,794.21  
Transportation  $    14,415,316.28  
Feedstock costs  $    56,030,419.48  
Enzyme Costs  $          588,893.49  
Other costs  $       8,289,588.28  
handling and loss  $          125,000.00  
Grinding Costs (ethanol)  $       4,511,829.68  
Denaturant Cost  $    10,880,065.58  
SUGAR PRODUCTION  $    56,357,196.32  
TOTAL VARIABLE EXP.  $  146,686,479.42  
TOTAL GROSS MARGIN  $  118,001,314.79  
Salaries  $       3,228,654.21  
Benefits  $       1,291,461.68  
Total Labor  $       4,520,115.90  
Production Expenses  $  146,686,479.42  
Total Variable and Conversion Costs  $  151,206,595.32  
Maintenance  $       3,544,588.11  
Insurance  $       2,658,441.08  
Property Tax  $          886,147.03  
Depreciation  $       5,762,045.11  
Interest  $       4,895,145.74  
SUGAR MILL  $    11,177,149.08  
Total Fixed  $    28,923,516.15  
Supplies  $             26,559.12  
Miscellaneous*  $             42,494.58  
Total Other  $             69,053.70  
TOTAL EXPENSES  $  180,199,165.17  




Table 45 - Expanded Capacity Collocated Cellulosic Ethanol Plant Revenue Details with 25 






Ethanol Sugar TOTAL GROSS SALES 
Mean  $      31,777,602.97   $  99,817,290.46   $  51,620,298.34   $       81,840,236.03   $        265,584,755.36  
StDev            2,393,027.81         3,247,743.33          1,514,252.90              1,517,285.63                  4,859,044.35  
CV                            7.53                         3.25                          2.93                              1.85                                   1.83  
Min  $      25,461,612.18   $  91,111,870.35   $  46,623,868.29   $       78,715,677.06   $        256,400,877.96  
Max  $      38,736,642.17  $109,951,025.08  $  56,928,381.92   $       84,429,817.92   $        273,306,265.46  
Sample Iterations 
1 29480983.97 97168693.85 51047256.88 $78,715,677.06  $256,412,611.79  
2 32315630.15 97427207.75 50140101.95 $79,296,590.66  $259,179,530.53  
3 34104562.1 102471716.6 52088034.47 $83,517,644.27  $272,181,957.45  
4 31319112.81 97850148.3 50690893.76 $81,407,928.14  $261,268,083.02  
5 27728667.71 103155997.3 53447838.4 $83,645,652.77  $267,978,156.21  
6 35126120.2 101234672.3 52486189.8 $80,422,468.96  $269,269,451.27  
7 35358258.7 103636958.9 53214755.66 $81,096,292.23  $273,306,265.46  
8 35011650.64 101549999.3 51388378.97 $82,599,146.23  $270,549,175.14  
9 31413907.82 102316367.8 53665613.11 $82,362,565.24  $269,758,453.95  
10 31213413.66 101552693.2 53027904.55 $81,871,036.57  $267,665,047.94  
11 32481267.51 99915872.08 52423860.46 $79,900,919.46  $264,721,919.52  
12 28877678.79 99457830.56 52376652.12 $81,564,917.12  $262,277,078.59  
13 31000246.89 100090745.5 50272509.85 $84,011,377.75  $265,374,879.93  
14 33327440.21 100928317 52461314.05 $80,033,240.43  $266,750,311.65  
15 29367288.93 105608477.9 54371414.83 $81,294,208.46  $270,641,390.10  
16 31149185.25 100442881 53034356.61 $84,429,817.92  $269,056,240.75  
17 33520487.77 91888224.53 48759048.43 $82,233,117.22  $256,400,877.96  
18 29580687.38 98843602.05 51528518.88 $83,105,988.11  $263,058,796.41  
19 31571592.73 103994057.2 52497990.99 $82,082,203.70  $270,145,844.61  
20 33819485.45 94653691.97 50462238.67 $80,576,656.82  $259,512,072.92  
21 32543328.35 100229818.8 51214277.09 $81,951,678.62  $265,939,102.91  
22 30908974.05 95427613.66 50867091.27 $81,344,282.83  $258,547,961.79  
23 32612588.92 99548894.48 52182534.74 $82,964,593.70  $267,308,611.84  
24 31791364.87 100063479.7 51987137.52 $81,412,155.19  $265,254,137.31  




Table 46 - Expanded Capacity Collocated Cellulosic Ethanol Plant Expense and Net 
Income Details with 25 Sample Iterations - All-Feedstock Cellulosic Ethanol and Sugar 
Total Variable and 
Conversion Costs Total Fixed TOTAL EXPENSES NET 
 $          151,359,322.15   $  28,931,867.53   $  180,360,243.38   $  84,488,629.04  
                 2,107,727.53               50,448.32            2,135,923.32          3,890,415.55  
                                 1.39                         0.17                           1.18                          4.60  
 $          147,473,376.57   $  28,823,979.07   $  176,448,961.66   $  72,481,390.71  
 $          155,687,717.25   $  29,015,732.20   $  184,708,947.35   $  96,365,990.97  
Sample Iterations 
$149,638,064.62  $28,881,664.30  $178,588,782.62  77823829.17 
$147,473,376.57  $28,906,531.39  $176,448,961.66  82730568.87 
$152,550,707.60  $28,977,676.30  $181,597,437.60  90584519.85 
$150,835,090.78  $28,906,292.02  $179,810,436.50  81457646.52 
$154,030,540.17  $28,989,422.53  $183,089,016.41  84889139.8 
$151,407,478.70  $28,847,867.98  $180,324,400.37  88945050.9 
$150,600,573.48  $28,973,434.79  $179,643,061.97  93663203.49 
$152,567,303.69  $28,896,961.04  $181,533,318.42  89015856.72 
$152,418,353.32  $28,965,502.14  $181,452,909.15  88305544.8 
$151,045,908.82  $28,977,495.30  $180,092,457.82  87572590.12 
$148,602,407.33  $28,873,886.58  $177,545,347.61  87176571.91 
$152,401,112.80  $28,965,735.84  $181,435,902.34  80841176.25 
$155,687,717.25  $28,952,176.40  $184,708,947.35  80665932.58 
$148,140,760.95  $28,897,985.73  $177,107,800.37  89642511.28 
$151,592,426.42  $28,869,978.15  $180,531,458.27  90109931.83 
$153,358,281.91  $28,981,635.10  $182,408,970.72  86647270.03 
$148,293,617.05  $28,930,707.81  $177,293,378.56  79107499.4 
$152,406,937.16  $28,970,590.16  $181,446,581.02  81612215.39 
$152,637,661.24  $28,971,256.87  $181,677,971.81  88467872.8 
$149,362,331.00  $28,823,979.07  $178,255,363.77  81256709.15 
$151,675,026.10  $28,928,051.77  $180,672,131.56  85266971.35 
$149,425,880.23  $28,973,854.68  $178,468,788.61  80079173.18 
$152,730,753.06  $28,938,504.03  $181,738,310.79  85570301.05 
$150,318,091.73  $28,879,766.04  $179,266,911.47  85987225.84 
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